無線ネットワークにおける認証サービスと安全な通信方式に関する研究 by 陸 璜 & LU Huang
Authentication Service and Secure
Communications for Wireless Networks
著者 陸 ?
year 2014
その他のタイトル 無線ネットワークにおける認証サービスと安全な通
信方式に関する研究
学位授与大学 筑波大学 (University of Tsukuba)
学位授与年度 2013
報告番号 12102甲第6859号
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00123449
Authentication Service and Secure
Communications for Wireless Networks
Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering
University of Tsukuba
March 2014
Huang LU



i 
 
論文概要（和文要旨） 
無線ネットワークは、例えセルラー、アドホックや Wi-Fi などの無線通信方式を用いるコンピュー
タネットワークである。近年、無線ネットワークのアプリケーション・ドメインでは、軍事および民用
の両方において、重要性が増している。この論文では、無線ネットワークにおいて、自動/自律的
なネットワーク、具体的に、無線センサネットワーク（WSN）と車両間アドホックネットワーク
（VANET）に注目し研究を行う。WSN と VANET では、基地局が必要をしない、相互に通信する
無線ノードのコレクションで構成され、例え高速道路、森林と戦場のような配線できない場所に拡
張することが可能である。 
 情報セキュリティは、無線ネットワークによるアプリケーションにおいては、重要な要件になりつ
つある。本論文では、無線データ通信を保護するために基準を取り調べたうえ、伝送効率、ネット
ワーク実用性やセキュリティなど望ましい要件に実現するよう、ネットワークのバランスがとれるア
ーキテクチャを設計することを目指す。我々は、WSN と VANET のデータ通信において、認証サ
ービスに基づくセキュリティを提供することに取り組む。具体的には、クラスタベース WSN にて安
全かつ効率的なルーティング/データ通信方式と、VANET の条件的なプライバシー保護認証構
造の提案である。 
 無線センサネットワーク（WSN）において、無線ノードのクラスタリングは、システムのスループット
を向上させ、エネルギーを節約する効率的な方法である。一方、 WSN システムは、多くの場合、
無人や敵対環境に配置されている。したがって、我々は、ノードのクラスタが動的かつ周期的に
形成されるクラスタベース WSN（CWSN）のために、セキュリティ保証方法を取り組み、対称鍵の
ペアリングよりセキュリティのキー管理が不足であると示す。 
 論文では、まず CWSNs のために ID ベース認証方式を用いる安全なルーティング・プロトコル
（SRIS）を提案する。SRIS において、クラスタヘッド（CH）が自律的に選ばれ、直接に基地局（BS）
と通信し、リーフ・センサノード（非 CH ノード）は、通信信号の強度によってクラスタに参加する。
SRIS プロトコルのセキュリティは IBC に基づいており、これで、ユーザの公開鍵が自分 ID 情報と
なり、ユーザは補助的なデータ通信せずに該当する秘密鍵を取得することができる。そのため、
提案の SRIS プロトコルは通信に効率的である。次に、SRIS プロトコルに基づいて、ID ベース・デ
ジタル署名（IBS）方式と ID ベース・オンライン/オフライン・デジタル署名（IBOOS）方式を利用し、
SET-IBS と SET-IBOOS に名付けて、CWSNs向けの安全かつ効率的なデータ通信（SET）プロト
コルを二つ提案する。SET-IBS および SET-IBOOS プロトコルは、CWSN のセキュリティ要件を
実現し、しかも IDベース暗号システムの適用によって通信に効率的である。提案した SET プロト
コルは、対称鍵暗号化を利用する安全な通信プロトコルに現れる、孤児ノード問題（orphan node 
problem）を解決した。我々は、システム評価によって SET-IBS と SET-IBOOS プロトコルの実用
性を示し、セキュリティ要件や、様々なセキュリティ攻撃に対する対処法を分析した。また、数式
計算およびネットワーク・シミュレーションを用いて、提案した通信プロトコルの高効率性を表明し
た。 
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 車両間アドホックネットワーク（VANET）において、認証サービスは車両間および車-道端間の
無線通信に不可欠なセキュリティ・サービスである。一方、車は車両データの悪用とプライバシー
への攻撃を防ぐだけでなく、通信メッセージの否認防止より、事故や責任を引き受けなければな
らない。VANET に対して、プライバシー保護と匿名認証の提供に注目して提案された研究は数
が多くある。したがって、予備研究として、特にプライバシー保護の認証方式（PPA）の調査に取り
組み、既存文献/研究の分類と評価をする。ここで、認証方式とプライバシー保護のための暗号
方式およびメカニズムにより、PPA の既存研究手法の長所と短所を要約し、今後に VANET のた
めの PPA研究のオープン問題を指摘した。 
 その後、VANET のためのプライバシー保護と否認防止機能を考慮した車両認証方式につい
て研究する。ここで、VANET における、プライバシー保護と否認防止機能を持つ認証構造
（ACPN）を提案する。 ACPN の目的は、認証用時間、ストレージ、および通信オーバーヘッドの
効率化を考えながら、否認防止機能とプライバシー保護のメカニズムを提供することである。
ACPN 認証構造では、合法的な第三者が車両の仮名から実 ID を取得することにより、車両の否
認防止機能を実現するために、公開鍵暗号方式（PKC）を利用する。自己生成された PKC ベー
スの車両仮名は、プライバシー保護機能を持つ認証方式において、識別子の代わりに使用され
る。既存の IBS 方式と IBOOS 方式は、路側機（RSU）と車両間の認証（V2R/R2V 認証）、および
車々間の認証（V2V 認証）、それぞれのために利用される。よって、悪質な車両が責任から脱出
されないよう、否認防止のための追跡機能を持ちながら、条件的な車両の匿名性を提供する。
我々は、ACPN に対して、VANET の車両認証、プライバシー保護、否認防止機能、および他の
セキュリティ目的を分析した。また、効率的な IBS と IBOOS 方式を利用して典型的な性能評価を
行ったうえ、VANETにおいて ACPN認証構造の実用性と適切さを示した。 
 
iAbstract
A wireless network is a computer network that uses wireless connections, such as
cellular, ad hoc and Wi-Fi wireless connections. In recent years, the application
domains of wireless networks are gaining importance in both military and non-military
organizations. In this dissertation, we focus on the self-organizing networks in the
wireless networks, specifically, the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and the Vehicular
Ad hoc Networks (VANETs). WSNs and VANETs consist of a collection of wireless
nodes that communicate with each other automatically, and are capable to be extended
to the places that cannot be wired to, such as highways, forests and battlefields.
Security is becoming a critical requirement of applications in such wireless
networks. We aim to investigate the criteria for protecting the transmitted data in
the wireless communication, and design a balanced architecture of the network for the
desired requirements such as transmission efficiency, network feasibility and security.
In this dissertation, we focus on providing security to the data communication in
WSNs and VANETs based on the authentication service, specifically, the secure routing
and data transmission for cluster-based WSNs, and the conditional privacy-preserving
authentication frameworks for VANETs.
In WSNs, clustering is an efficient method to increase system throughput and
save energy. Meanwhile, WSNs are often deployed in unattended and adversarial
environments. We study the problem of adding security to cluster-based WSNs
(CWSNs), where clusters are formed dynamically and periodically. We point out the
deficiency in the security key management of security with the symmetric key pairing,
and study the ID-based cryptography (IBC) for security in CWSNs.
In order to provide security efficiently and effectively in CWSNs, firstly, we propose
a novel Secure Routing protocol using ID-based Signature (SRIS) for CWSNs. In SRIS,
cluster-heads (CHs) are selected autonomously and communicate with the base station
(BS) directly, whereas leaf (non-CH) sensor nodes join a cluster depending on the
strength of transmission signal. The security in SRIS is based on IBC, in which sensor
nodes’ public keys are their ID information, and the nodes can obtain the corresponding
private keys without auxiliary data transmission. Therefore, SRIS is efficient in
communication. Secondly, we propose two Secure and Efficient data Transmission
(SET) protocols for CWSNs, called SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, by using the ID-
based digital signature (IBS) scheme and the ID-based online/oﬄine digital Signature
(IBOOS) scheme, respectively. The SET-IBS security relies on the hardness of the
Diffie-Hellman problem in the pairing domain of cyclic groups. SET-IBOOS further
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reduces the communication and computational overhead in SET-IBS for security, while
its security relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in cyclic groups.
SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS are efficient in communication and applying the ID-based
crypto-systems, which achieve security requirements in CWSNs, as well as solve the
orphan node problem in the secure transmission protocols with the symmetric key
management. We analyze the security in SRIS, SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS with respect
to the security requirements. The quantitative calculations and network simulations
are provided to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed protocols. The results show
that, the proposed protocols have better performance than the existing protocols for
CWSNs, in terms of security overhead and energy consumption.
In VANETs, authentication is a crucial security service for both inter-vehicle and
vehicle-roadside communications. On the other hand, vehicles have to be prevented
from the misuse of their private data and the attacks on their privacy, as well as
to be capable of being investigated from accidents or liabilities for the message non-
repudiation. There is a number of research works focusing on providing the anonymous
authentication with preserved privacy in VANETs. Thus as the preliminaries, we
specifically provide a survey on the privacy-preserving authentication (PPA) schemes
proposed for VANETs, by emphasizing classifications of the existing literature, devel-
oping a perspective on PPA, and evaluating trends. We investigate and categorize
the existing PPA schemes by their key cryptographies for authentication and the
mechanisms for privacy preservation. We also provide a comparative study/summary
of the advantages and disadvantages of the existing PPA schemes, and point out the
open issues for PPA in VANETs.
In the following, we investigate the vehicular authentication in VANETs, which
deals with the issues of privacy-preservation and non-repudiation. We propose a
novel ID-based Authentication framework with Adaptive Privacy-preservation (IAAP)
for VANETs. The primary objective of IAAP is to provide a privacy-preserving
authentication mechanism efficiently in terms of the processing time, storage and
communication overhead. In IAAP, adaptive self-generated pseudonyms are used as
identifiers instead of real-world IDs without exposing vehicle privacy, and the update
of the pseudonyms depends on vehicular demands. Furthermore, we propose a novel
Authentication framework with Conditional Privacy-preservation and Non-repudiation
(ACPN) for VANETs. In ACPN, we introduce the public-key cryptography (PKC)
to the pseudonym generation, which ensures a legitimate third party to achieve the
non-repudiation of vehicles by obtaining the vehicle real IDs. The self-generated PKC-
based pseudonyms are also used as identifiers instead of real-world IDs for the privacy-
preserving authentication. The existing IBS scheme and the IBOOS scheme are used,
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for the authentication between the road side units (RSUs) and vehicles (V2R/R2V
authentication), and the authentication among vehicles (V2V authentication), re-
spectively. ACPN provides conditional vehicle anonymity for privacy preservation
with having traceability for non-repudiation. Authentication, privacy preservation,
non-repudiation and other objectives of IAAP and ACPN have been analyzed for
VANETs. Typical performance evaluation has been conducted using efficient IBS and
IBOOS schemes. We show that the proposed authentication frameworks are feasible
and adequate to be used efficiently in the VANET environment.
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Introduction
This chapter presents the overall introduction of this dissertation. The research
background, scope, motivations and related work are studied in Section 1.1 ∼ 1.1.
The summary of the contributions of the dissertation is included in Section 1.5. The
organization of the dissertation is provided in Section 1.6.
1.1 Research Background and Scope
A wireless network is a computer network that uses wireless connections, such as
cellular, ad hoc and Wi-Fi wireless connections [1]. In this dissertation, we focus
on the self-organizing networks in the wireless networks, specifically, the Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) and the Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) as shown in
Figure 1.1 with their affiliations. WSNs and VANETs consist of a collection of wireless
nodes that communicate with each other without any infrastructure or predetermined
topology [2], and are capable to be extended to the places that cannot be wired to,
such as highways, forests and battlefields. Figure shows the research scope of this
dissertation and its affiliations. WSNs and VANETs are affiliated with the Wireless
Ad hoc Networks (WANETs), which are derived from the Packet Radio Networks
(PRNETs) in the 1970s [3].
Security is becoming a critical requirement of applications in the wireless networks.
We aim to investigate the criteria for protecting the transmitted data in the wireless
communication, and design a balanced architecture of the network for the desired
requirements such as transmission efficiency, network feasibility and security. Au-
thentication service is an effective method to achieve security for communications. It
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Figure 1.1: A categorization of the communication network
enables receivers to verify the received packets that are delivered by the communication
originating senders with the unmodified data source [4]. In this dissertation, we
focus on providing security to the data communication in WSNs and VANETs
based on the authentication service, specifically, the secure and efficient routing/data
transmission protocols for cluster-based WSNs, and the conditional privacy-preserving
authentication frameworks for VANETs.
1.2 Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
One of the know applications for WANETs is the environmental information sensing
through WSNs. WSNs have significant impact upon the efficiency of military and civil
applications by monitoring physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature,
sound and motion [5]. Many WSNs are deployed in harsh, neglected and often
adversarial physical environments for certain applications, such as military domains
and sensing tasks with trustless surroundings [6]. Meanwhile, the adversaries and
their attack models have been investigated, which threaten the data transmission in
the network [7]. Thus, secure and efficient data gathering and transmission are critical
and demanded in such practical WSNs.
The cluster-based WSN (CWSN) architecture has been investigated by researchers
in order to achieve the network scalability and management, which maximizes node
lifetime and reduce bandwidth consumption by using local collaboration among sensor
nodes [8]. Adding security to CWSNs is challenging, because they dynamically,
randomly and periodically rearrange the clusters and data links of the network [9].
Therefore, providing steady long-lasting node-to-node trust relationships and common
key distributions are inadequate for CWSNs. In order to solve the security issues, we
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propose the secure and efficient routing/data transmission protocols for CWSNs, by
applying the digital signatures to message packets in the authentication service.
1.3 Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
Another known application for WANETs is the vehicular communications through
VANETs. The vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication has been studied in recent
years to improve drivers driving and safety [10]. VANETs provide the driver essential
information to improve driving by transmitting traffic messages such as collision/jam
warning and road traffic alarms. Due to the possibility of accidents and life-critical
situations, the secure exchange of information among vehicles is essential [11]. Thus,
security issues have received a great attention in VANETs.
VANETs are utilized for a broad range of safety applications (such as collision
warnings and traffic information), and non-safety applications (such as road navigation
and mobile infotainment). Authentication is a crucial security service for VANETs in
both inter-vehicle and vehicle-roadside communication. On the other hand, vehicles
have to be prevented from the misuse of their private data and the attacks on their
privacy, where they are capable of being investigated from accidents or liabilities
for non-repudiation. Especially, the safety applications require a strong mutual
authentication, because most of the safety-related messages may contain life-critical
information [11]. In VANETs, vehicles do not want their private information such as
name, position, moving routes, and user data to be revealed, against illegal tracing and
user profiling. The anonymity of identity should be supported in VANETs. From the
above point of view, we propose the novel privacy-preserving authentication schemes
for vehicular communications.
1.4 Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of the related research on secure communi-
cations and authentication service, which is proposed and applied for cluster-based
wireless sensor networks (CWSNs) and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).
The data transmission in CWSNs are vulnerable to a number of security attacks
[6, 12], such as passive/active attacks on wireless channels and node compromising
attacks. Especially, attacks to CHs in CWSNs could result in serious damage to
the network, because data transmission and data aggregation depend on the CHs
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fundamentally. If an attacker manages to compromise or pretend to be a CH, it can
provoke attacks such as sinkhole and selective forwarding attacks, hence disrupting the
network. On the other hand, an attacker may intend to inject bogus sensing data into
the WSN, e.g., pretend as a leaf node sending bogus information towards the CHs.
Nevertheless, LEACH-like protocols are more robust against insider attacks than other
types of protocols in WSNs [12]. It is because CHs are rotating from nodes to nodes
in the network by rounds, which makes it harder for intruders to identify the routing
elements as the intermediary nodes and attack them. The characteristics of LEACH-
like protocols reduce the risks of being attacked on intermediary nodes, and make it
harder for an adversary to identify and compromise important nodes (CH nodes).
In order to provide security for communications in CWSNs, some secure data
transmission protocols have been proposed in the literature, such as SecLEACH [9] as
GS-LEACH [13]. Most of them, however, apply the symmetric key management for
security, which suffers from a so-called orphan node problem [14]. This problem occurs
when a node does not share a pairwise key with others in its preloaded key ring. In
order to mitigate the storage cost of symmetric keys, the key ring in a node is not
sufficient for it to share pairwise symmetric keys with all of the nodes in a network.
In such a case, it cannot participate in any cluster, and therefore, has to elect itself
as a cluster-head (CH). Furthermore, the orphan node problem reduces the possibility
of a node joining with a CH, when the number of alive nodes owning pairwise keys
decreases after a long-term operation of the network. Since the more CHs elected
by themselves, the more overall energy consumed of the network [15, 16], the orphan
node problem increases the overhead of transmission and system energy consumption
by raising the number of CHs. In order to solve the above issues, we propose the secure
and efficient routing/data transmission protocols for CWSNs, by applying the digital
signatures to message packets for security.
In VANETs, vehicles do not want their private information such as name, position,
moving routes, and user data to be revealed, against illegal tracing and user profiling.
The anonymity of identity should be supported in VANETs. The usage of pseudonyms
to achieve vehicle anonymity is a superior solution for privacy preservation to this issue
[17], which intimately links a real-world identity (ID) to the corresponding pseudonyms.
On the other hand, when traffic accidents or certain crimes occur, vehicle anonymity
should be conditional, and the identity information has to be revealed by the legal
authority to establish the liability of accidents or crimes. In this case, non-repudiation
in VANETs prevents a vehicle from denying previous commitments or actions [18].
Concerning security in VANETs, there are many attacks which threaten the V2R
and V2V communications on the road, including the impersonation attack, Sybil
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attack, identity revealing attack, location tracking attack and repudiation attack
[19, 20]. Authentication frameworks using ID-based cryptosystem have been proposed
to reduce overheads [21–24], in which the certificate management process has been
simplified by using the vehicles identity as its public keys for cryptography. In order to
reduce the computation overhead of the ID-based signature (IBS) process for VANETs,
the ID-based online/oﬄine signature (IBOOS) scheme is preferable for authentication
in VANETs, which is also an attractive solution.
1.5 Research Contributions
In this dissertation, we focus on providing security to the data communication in
WSNs and VANETs based on the authentication service, specifically, the secure
and efficient routing/data transmission for cluster-based WSNs, and the conditional
privacy-preserving authentication frameworks for VANETs. The main contributions
of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
1.5.1 Secure Routing using ID-based Signature for CWSNs
We propose a novel Secure Routing protocol using ID-based Signature (SRIS) for
CWSNs in Chapter 3. In SRIS, cluster-heads (CHs) are selected autonomously and
communicate with the base station (BS) directly, whereas leaf sensor nodes join a
cluster depending on the strength of transmission signal. The secure routing is based
on IBC, in which users public keys are their identity (ID) information, and users can
obtain the corresponding private keys without auxiliary data transmission. Therefore,
the secure protocol is efficient in communication, and it fully solves the orphan node
problem. However, it suffers from high-computation cost for pairing. We analyze the
positive and negative aspects of SRIS quantitatively in calculations and simulations,
with respect to both computational and communication cost.
1.5.2 Secure and Efficient Data Transmission for CWSNs
Extended from the study of Chapter 3, We propose two Secure and Efficient data
Transmission (SET) protocols for CWSNs in Chapter 4, called SET-IBS and SET-
IBOOS, by using the ID-based digital signature (IBS) scheme and the ID-based
online/oﬄine digital Signature (IBOOS) scheme, respectively. In SET-IBS, security
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relies on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem in the pairing domain. SET-
IBOOS further reduces the computational overhead for protocol security, which is
crucial for WSNs, while its security relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm
problem. SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS are efficient in communication and applying the
ID-based crypto-systems, which achieves security requirements in CWSNs, as well
as solved the orphan node problem in the secure transmission protocols with the
symmetric key management. We show the feasibility of SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS with
respect to the security requirements and security analysis against various attacks. The
calculations and simulations are provided to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed
protocols. The results show that, the proposed protocols have better performance than
the existing secure protocols for CWSNs, in terms of security overhead and energy
consumption.
1.5.3 Survey on Privacy-Preserving Authentication Schemes
for VANETs
There is a number of research work focusing on providing the anonymous authen-
tication with preserved privacy in VANETs. Thus, we specifically provide a survey
on the Privacy-Preserving Authentication (PPA) schemes proposed for VANETs in
Chapter 5, by emphasizing classifications of the existing literature, developing a
perspective on PPA, and evaluating trends. We investigate and categorize the existing
PPA schemes by their key cryptographies for authentication and the mechanisms for
privacy preservation. We also provide a comparative study/summary of the advantages
and disadvantages of the existing PPA schemes. Lastly, the open issues and future
objectives are identified for PPA in VANETs.
1.5.4 ID-based Authentication Framework with Adaptive
Privacy-Preservation for VANETs
We propose a novel ID-based Authentication framework with Adaptive Privacy-
preservation (IAAP) for VANETs in Chapter 6. The primary objective of IAAP is
to provide a privacy-preserving authentication mechanism efficiently in terms of the
processing time, storage and communication overhead. Different from other pre-store
schemes, an ID pool of regional RSUs is preloaded in each vehicle, because the number
of RSUs is comparatively small and does not change frequently. In IAAP, adaptive
self-generated pseudonyms are used as identifiers instead of real-world IDs without
exposing vehicle privacy, and the update of the pseudonyms depends on vehicular
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demands. The IBS scheme and the IBOOS scheme are used, for the authentication
between the road side units (RSUs) and vehicles (V2R/R2V authentication), and the
authentication among vehicles (V2V authentication), respectively. System evaluation
has been conducted for the proposed IAAP in terms of storage requirement and
computation efficiency. It shows that, IAAP is suitable to the VANET environment.
1.5.5 Authentication Framework with Conditional Privacy-
Preservation and Non-Repudiation for VANETs
Extended from the study of Chapter 6, We propose a novel Authentication framework
with Conditional Privacy-preservation and Non-repudiation (ACPN) for VANETs
in Chapter 7. In ACPN, we introduce the public-key cryptography (PKC) to the
pseudonym generation, which ensures a legitimate third party to achieve the non-
repudiation of vehicles by obtaining the vehicle real IDs. The self-generated PKC-
based pseudonyms are also used as identifiers instead of real-world IDs for the privacy-
preserving authentication. The existing IBS scheme and the IBOOS scheme are
used, for the V2R/R2V authentication and the V2V authentication, respectively.
ACPN provides conditional vehicle anonymity for privacy preservation with having
traceability for non-repudiation, in case that malicious vehicles abuse anonymous
authentication techniques to achieve malicious goals or escape from their liabilities.
Authentication, privacy preservation, non-repudiation and other objectives of ACPN
have been analyzed for VANETs. Typical performance evaluation has been conducted
using efficient IBS and IBOOS schemes. We show that ACPN is feasible and adequate
to be used efficiently in the VANET environment.
1.6 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is an introduction that describes
the scope of the dissertation and its contributions. Chapter 2 provides the system
descriptions of WSNs and VANETs, including the network characteristics and their
architectures. The security vulnerabilities and research objectives are also investigated.
Chapter 3 presents a secure routing protocol for CWSNs using ID-based digital
signature. Chapter 4 presents a secure and efficient data transmission for CWSNs.
Chapter 5 provides a survey on the privacy-preserving authentication schemes proposed
for VANETs. Chapter 6 presents a novel ID-based authentication framework with
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adaptive privacy preservation for VANETs. Chapter 7 presents a conditional privacy-
preserving authentication framework achieving non-repudiation for VANETs. Chapter
8 concludes the dissertation and presents the future work. Additionally, we include
the detailed descriptions of the original IBS and IBOOS schemes that we adapted
and utilized in this thesis in Appendix A, the replies to professors’ comments in the
dissertation preliminary review in Appendix B, and a list of the author’s publications
at the end of the thesis.
9Chapter 2
System Description and Research
Objectives
In this chapter, we provide the system descriptions of WSNs and VANETs, including
the network characteristics and their architectures. We also investigate the security
vulnerabilities and research objectives.
2.1 System Description of CWSNs
The realization of the WSN applications requires the networking techniques of
WANETs, which are not well suited for the unique features and application require-
ments of WSNs. To illustrate this point, the differences between WSNs and WANETs
are pointed as follows [5].
• The number of sensor nodes in a WSN can be several orders higher than the
nodes in a WANET.
• Sensor nodes are densely deployed.
• Sensor nodes are prone to failures.
• Sensor nodes in WSNs mainly use broadcast communication paradigm, whereas
most WANETs are based on point-to-point communications.
• Sensor nodes are limited in power, computational capacities, and memory.
• Sensor nodes may not have global identifications (global IDs) because of the large
amount of overhead.
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Figure 2.1: Some commercial sensor nodes and an illustration of CWSN architecture
Cluster-based data transmission in WSNs has been investigated by researchers
in order to achieve the network scalability and management, which maximizes node
lifetime and reduce bandwidth consumption by using local collaboration among sensor
nodes [8]. Consider a CWSN consisting of a fixed base station (BS) and a large number
of wireless sensor nodes, which are homogeneous in functionalities and capabilities.
We assume that the BS is always reliable, i.e., the BS is a trusted authority (TA).
Meanwhile, the sensor nodes may be compromised by attackers, and the data trans-
mission may be interrupted from attacks on wireless channel. In a cluster-based WSN
(CWSN) architecture, the network is separated into clusters, and every cluster has a
leader sensor node, regarded as cluster-head (CH). A CH aggregates the data collected
by the leaf nodes (non-CH sensor nodes) in its cluster, and sends the aggregation
to the base station (BS). Conventionally, a sensor node switches into sleep mode for
energy saving when it does not sense or transmit data, depending on the TDMA (time
division multiple access) control used for data transmission.
We show an illustration of a CWSN in Figure 2.1. In CWSNs, data sensing,
processing and transmission consume energy of sensor nodes. The cost of data
transmission is much more expensive than that of data processing. Thus, the method
that the intermediate node (e.g., a CH) aggregates data and sends it to the BS is
preferred, than the method that each sensor node directly sends data to the BS
[8, 25]. The LEACH (Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) protocol presented
by Heinzelman et al. [15, 16] is a widely known and effective one to reduce and
balance the total energy consumption for CWSNs. In order to prevent quick energy
consumption of the set of CHs, LEACH randomly rotates CHs among all sensor nodes
in the network, in rounds. LEACH achieves improvements in terms of network lifetime.
Following the idea of LEACH, a number of protocols have been presented such as
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APTEEN [26] and PEACH [27]. In this dissertation, for convenience, we call this sort
of cluster-based protocols as LEACH-like protocols.
2.2 Research Objectives for CWSNs
In order to provide security for communications in CWSNs, some secure data trans-
mission protocols have been proposed in the literature, such as SecLEACH [9] as
GS-LEACH [13]. Most of them, however, apply the symmetric key management for
security, which suffers from a so-called orphan node problem [14]. This problem occurs
when a node does not share a pairwise key with others in its preloaded key ring. In
order to mitigate the storage cost of symmetric keys, the key ring in a node is not
sufficient for it to share pairwise symmetric keys with all of the nodes in a network.
In such a case, it cannot participate in any cluster, and therefore, has to elect itself
as a cluster-head (CH). Furthermore, the orphan node problem reduces the possibility
of a node joining with a CH, when the number of alive nodes owning pairwise keys
decreases after a long-term operation of the network. Since the more CHs elected by
themselves, the more overall energy consumed of the network [16], the orphan node
problem increases the overhead of transmission and system energy consumption by
raising the number of CHs.
The goal of this dissertation for CWSNs is to guarantee a secure and efficient
data transmission between leaf nodes and CHs, as well as transmission between CHs
and the BS. Meanwhile, most of existing secure transmission protocols for CWSNs
in the literature [9, 13, 28], however, apply the symmetric key management for
security, which suffers from the orphan node problem that is introduced previously.
In order to solve this orphan node problem, we propose the secure and efficient
routing/data transmission protocols for CWSNs, by applying the digital signatures to
the message authentication for security. The proposed protocols guarantee the security
requirements by using the ID-based crypto-systems for the authentication service in
CWSNs.
2.3 System Description of VANETs
Similarly to WSNs, a VANET is a mobile network that employs moving vehicles as
nodes to provide communication among vehicles, as well as between vehicles and nearby
fixed road side units (RSUs). A VANET turns every participating vehicle into a
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wireless router or node, allows vehicles in an approximately 300-meter range to connect
with each other. A VANET is distinguished from MANETs for the points as follows
[29].
• Due to high speed movement between vehicles, and frequently disconnected
network caused by high speed movement, a VANET has highly dynamic topology.
• Vehicular nodes in a VANET have sufficient energy and storage for communica-
tion, and the vehicles have longer transmission range compared to the ones in
MANETs.
• VANETs are subject to geographical type of communication with mobility
modeling and prediction on predefined roads.
• Delay constraint is strict in VANET communication, e.g., in collision avoidance
and life-critical related situations.
Figure 2.2: An Illustration of VANET architecture
We show an illustration of a VANET in Figure 2.2. Conventionally, VANETs
are separated by different regions (e.g., a state or province), and a regional trusted
authority (RTA) serves an individual region, which acts as a certificate authority (CA)
for security. The RTA provides an authenticated recognition to each vehicle in a
VANET and is queried for investigation in case of any disputes in the network. The
RSUs assist the RTA in querying and tracking for certain vehicles of responsibilities.
As mobile wireless devices become increasingly influential in recent years, the demand
for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and vehicle-to-RSU (V2R) communication
increases continuously [30].
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2.4 Research Objectives for VANETs
In VANETs, vehicles do not want their private information such as name, position,
moving routes, and user data to be revealed, against illegal tracing and user profiling.
The anonymity of identity should be supported in VANETs. The usage of pseudonyms
to achieve vehicle anonymity is a superior solution for privacy preservation to this issue
[17], which intimately links a real-world identity (ID) to the corresponding pseudonyms.
On the other hand, when traffic accidents or certain crimes occur, vehicle anonymity
should be conditional, and the identity information has to be revealed by the legal
authority to establish the liability of accidents or crimes. In this case, non-repudiation
in VANETs prevents a vehicle from denying previous commitments or actions [18].
Authentication frameworks using ID-based cryptosystem have been proposed to reduce
overheads [21–24], in which the certificate management process has been simplified by
using the vehicles identity as its public keys for cryptography. In order to reduce
the computation overhead of the ID-based signature (IBS) process for VANETs, the
ID-based online/oﬄine signature (IBOOS) scheme is preferable for authentication in
VANETs, which is also an attractive solution.
In this dissertation, we study the security against these attacks specifically in au-
thentication with privacy preservation and non-repudiation for VANETs. We endeavor
to construct an efficient authentication framework for security, by using the vehicular
pseudonyms and ID-based key management for different kinds of communication in
VANETs. Besides, we consider many other objectives that are preferred in the existing
work for the effective and efficient authentication [31], such as message confidentiality,
independency, availability and integration. Generally, the goal is to provide an effective
authentication mechanism in VANETs, in terms of the processing time, storage and
communication overhead.
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Chapter 3
A Secure Routing Protocol Using
ID-based Digital Signature for
CWSNs
In this chapter, we study the problem of adding security to Cluster-based Wireless
Sensor Networks (CWSNs) where clusters are formed dynamically and periodically.
We first point out the deficiency in the secure routing protocols with the symmetric
key pairing. Then, with the investigation of ID-based cryptography for security in
WSNs, we propose a novel Secure Routing protocol with ID-based Signature (SRIS)
for CWSNs. Because of the communication overhead for security, we provide analysis
and simulation results in details to illustrate how various parameters act between
security and energy efficiency.
3.1 Introduction
AWireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a network system comprising spatially distributed
devices using wireless sensor nodes to monitor physical or environmental conditions at
different locations, such as sound, temperature, and motion. In a WSN, the individual
nodes are capable of sensing their environments, processing the information data
locally, and sending data to one or more collection points through a wireless link
[32]. Sensor nodes are severely constrained by the energy from batteries, which limits
the lifetime and quality of the network. Therefore, it is crucial for WSNs to maximize
nodes’ lifetimes, reduce bandwidth consumption by using local collaboration among
sensor nodes [8]. Many sensor systems are deployed in harsh, unattended and often
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adversarial physical environments, such as battle fields and military domains with
trustless surroundings [5]. Therefore, security is vastly requested in many practical
WSNs.
Grouping sensor nodes into clusters has been widely investigated by researchers in
order to achieve the network system’s scalability and management objectives. Every
cluster would has a leader sensor node, often referred to as the cluster-head (CH),
which can be fixed or variable. CHs aggregate the data collected by the sensor nodes
in its cluster, thus, clustering decreases the number of relayed packets. As the benefits
of clustering, it conserves communication bandwidth and avoids redundant exchange of
messages among sensor nodes, because of limiting the inter-cluster interactions. Thus,
clustering prolongs the lifetime of WSNs [8, 33, 34].
Digital signature is one of the most critical security services offered by cryptog-
raphy. In traditional public key signature algorithms the public key of the signer is
essentially a random bit string picked from a given set. In traditional key management
systems, the binding between the public key and the identification of the signer is
obtained via a digital certificate [35]. As noticed by Shamir [36], it would be more
efficient if there is no need for this binding, in which the users identity would be
their public key. Moreover, by given the user’s identity, the public key could be easily
derived using some public specified algorithms. An identity based (ID-based) signature
scheme, whose security is based on the difficulty of factoring integers, is given in [37],
and it remained an open issue to develop an efficient ID-based encryption scheme. A
scheme given by Boneh and Franklin [35] becomes popular that, the scheme is based
on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem being related to a pairing algorithm [38].
In this chapter, we focus on efficient secure communications, and propose a
Secure Routing protocol with ID-based Signature (SRIS) for cluster-based WSNs
(CWSNs). In SRIS, CHs are selected autonomously and communicate with the base
station directly, whereas leaf sensor nodes join a cluster depending on the strength
of transmission signal. The security is based on the ID-based cryptography, in which
users’ public keys are their ID information, and users can obtain the corresponding
private keys without auxiliary data transmission. Therefore, SRIS is efficient in
communication. However, it suffers from high-computation cost for pairing. We
analyze the positive and negative aspects of the proposed SRIS quantitatively in
calculations and simulations, with respect to both computational and communication
cost.
In section II and section III, we provide an overview of related work and
preliminary knowledge related to this work. In section IV, we describe the features
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of our system, the clustering algorithm from LEACH, whereas security vulnerabilities
and objectives. In section V, we propose our ID-based secure routing protocol for
CWSNs. In section VI, we analyze our secure routing protocol with calculations and
simulations. Section VII offers conclusion and points of future work.
3.2 Related Work
In this section, we present the related work including the cluster-based routing
protocols, security issues, and ID-based cryptography.
The LEACH (Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) protocol presented in
[15, 16] is a widely known and effective one for WSNs of cluster-based architecture. It
assumes that every node can directly reach the BS by transmitting with high enough
energy. However, leaf sensor nodes (non-CH sensor nodes) send the sensed data to their
CHs in order to save energy, which then aggregate the data, and send the aggregation
to the BS. To prevent quick energy consuming of the set of CHs, LEACH randomly
rotates CHs among all sensor nodes in the network, from time to time in rounds.
LEACH achieved improvements compared to direct transmissions, as evaluated in
terms of nodes’ lifetime. Following the idea of LEACH, a number of protocols have
been presented such as PEGASIS (Power-Efficient Gathering in Sensor Information
Systems) [39], and PEACH (Power-efficient and adaptive clustering hierarchy protocol
for wireless sensor networks) [27], which use the similar concept with LEACH. In this
chapter, for convenience, we call this sort of cluster-based routing protocols as LEACH-
like protocols, and we inherit the algorithm from the original LEACH protocol for
clustering.
Because traditional privacy protection cannot solve security vulnerability in
WSNs, therefore, security protocols such as SPINS (Security Protocols for Sensor
Network) [40] and LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol) [41]
have been proposed. Adding security to LEACH-like protocols is challenging, because
its dynamic clustering makes key distribution solutions for node-to-node trust rela-
tionships messy and inadequate. There are some secure routing protocols based on
LEACH-like protocols, such as SecLECH [9] and GS-LEACH [13]. However, most of
them are applying symmetric key management scheme, which increases the overhead
of transmission by establishing pairwise keys. For example, SecLEACH has a problem
that if a node does not share a pairwise key with others in its preloaded key ring,
then it cannot participate in any cluster and has to elect itself as a CH. We call it the
orphan node problem and this problem increases the overhead of transmission.
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As the evolution of the traditional certificate-based cryptography, ID-based cryp-
tography (IBC) is receiving high regard since the idea of IBC proposed in 1984 [36].
The main idea is to derive an entity’s public key from its identity information, e.g.,
from its name or the ID number. However, the fully-functional ID-based encryption
scheme is not found until 2001 by Boneh and Franklin [35]. The scheme given by them
becomes popular, which is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem being related
to a pairing algorithm [38]. Recently, the concept of IBC has been rapid developed
in WSN systems. Carman in 2005 first combines the benefits of IBC and key pre-
distribution and sets into WSNs [42]. Furthermore, the authentication scheme using
digital signature, which applies IBC, has been proposed in [37].
3.3 Preliminaries
The preliminary knowledge of pairing technique and parameters used in IBC are
addressed below.
In the proposed secure routing protocol, the security is based on the Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Problem (BDHP) in the pairing domain. Therefore, the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) [43] for pairing in groups is required to be hard. Randomly select
two large primes p and q, and let E/Fp indicate an elliptic curve y
2 = x3 + ax + b
(4a3 + 27b2 6= 0) over the finite field Fp. We denote by G1 a q-order subgroup of the
additive group of points in E/Fp, and G2 a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group
in the finite field F∗p. The pairing is a mapping e : G1 × G1 → G2, which is a bilinear
map if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinear : ∀ P,Q,R, S ∈ G1, e (P +Q,R+ S)=e (P,R)e (P, S)e (Q,R) e (Q, S).
In the same way, ∀ c, d ∈ Z∗q , e (cP, dQ)=e (P, dQ)
c=e (cP,Q)d=e (P,Q)cd, etc.
2. Non-degeneracy : If P is a generator of G1, then e (P, P ) is a generator of G2.
3. Computability : There is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P,Q) in G2, for ∀
P,Q ∈ G1.
Weil pairing and Tate pairing are the examples of such bilinear mapping, the
comprehensive description of how pairing parameters be selected for security, refers to
[35] and [38].
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3.4 System Description and Security Objectives
This section introduces the network structure and the operation mechanism. After
that, security objectives are presented.
3.4.1 Network Architecture and Operation Mechanism
In this chapter, we consider a cluster-based WSN (CWSN) system that consists of
a fixed base station and a large number of sensor nodes, which are homogeneous in
functionalities and capabilities. We suppose that, the sink is always reliable, but sensor
nodes are subject to be compromised by the attackers. In the CWSN system, data are
sensed by sensor nodes and transmitted to a base station via CHs, which perform data
fusion. We assume that all sensor nodes and the BS use symmetric radio channel, that
nodes are distributed randomly, and that their energy is constrained.
The operation of the protocol is divided by rounds as shown in Figure 3.1. Each
round includes a set-up phase for constructing clusters and a steady-state phase for
transmitting data from sensor nodes to the BS via CHs. In each round, the algorithm
elects CHs in the set-up part, and in each frame, a sensor node transmits the data to
its CH.
RoundRound
Set-up Steady-state
Time
Frame
Figure 3.1: The time line in the proposed SRIS protocol
We use the dynamic clustering method from LEACH [15, 16] to all sensor nodes
to increase energy efficiency. For fair energy consumption, nodes are randomly elected
as CHs in rounds. With CHs, other non-CH sensor nodes join clusters using one-hop
transmission. In order to elect CHs in a round, each sensor node determines a random
number and compare it with the threshold in the current round.
3.4.2 Security Vulnerabilities and Objectives
Like other type routing protocols in WSNs, cluster-based routing protocols (LEACH-
like protocols) are vulnerable to a number of security attacks [12], e.g., jamming,
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spoofing, replay, etc. Because data aggregation and routing depend on the CHs
fundamentally, attacks involving CHs could be the serious damaging to the network
system. If an attacker manages to turn into a CH, it can provoke attacks such as
sinkhole and selective forwarding attacks, thus disrupting the network. On the other
hand, the attacker may intend to inject bogus sensing data into the network, especially
to pretend as leaf nodes sending bogus information towards the CHs [9]. Another type
of attack is network eavesdropping. Nevertheless, LEACH-like protocols are more
robust against insider attacks than most other types of routing protocols [12]. Because
CHs in LEACH are the intermediary nodes to the BS, which change from time to
time in rounds. The characteristics in LEACH-like protocols reduce the risks of being
attacked on intermediary nodes, and make it harder for an adversary to identify and
compromise important nodes.
3.5 Proposed SRIS for CWSNs
This section describes the operation details in the proposed Secure Routing protocol
with ID-based Signature (SRIS) for CWSNs.
3.5.1 Protocol Initialization
In the proposed SRIS protocol, time is divided into successive time intervals, which
are denoted by time-stamps Ts (for BS-to-node transmission) and ti (for leaf-to-CH
transmission). We assume that the BS and sensor nodes are synchronized. We then
adopt ID||ti as user’s public key for ID-based signature. In this way, before a sensor
node wants to authenticate itself to another node, it has to obtain its private key
first. Because each private key is valid only during the current time interval, sensor
nodes have to obtain a denotation of the new time interval to renew the private key at
the beginning of a new round. Upon node revocation, the BS needs to broadcast the
compromised node IDs to the sensor nodes, each node stores the revoked IDs within
the certain round.
Before the network deployment, the BS does the following operations of key pre-
distribution in the network:
1. Generate the pairing parameters (p, q,E/Fp,G1,G2, e), as described in Section
III. Select a generator P of G1 stochastically.
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2. Choose two cryptographic hash functions: H , for point mapping hash function
which maps strings to elements in G1, and h, which maps arbitrary inputs to
fixed-length outputs, e.g., SHA-1 [44].
3. Pick a random integer τ ∈ Z∗q , and set Ppub=τP as a network public key.
4. Preload each sensor node with the public system parameters
(p, q,E/Fp,G1,G2, e, H, h, P, τ).
3.5.2 Proposed Secure Routing
The proposed SRIS protocol operates in rounds based on LEACH. Each round has a
set-up phase and a steady-state phase. Because of the synchronization of time, sensor
nodes know when each round starts and ends. We first address the key management
of ID-based cryptography for secure routing, then introduce the operation of SRIS.
3.5.2.1 Key management for security
We adapt the algorithms of an IBS scheme from [37] to CWSNs practically and provide
the full algorithm in the signature signing and verification. Assume that sensor j wants
to broadcast a message M . It first obtains its private key as SKj=τH(ID||ti), where
IDj is the ID of node j, and ti is the time-stamp of the time interval in the current
round from TDMA (time division multiple access) control. The sensor then picks a
random α ∈ Z∗q and computes θ=e(P, P )
α. The sensor node further computes
cj = h(M‖ ti ‖θ ) , (3.1)
and let
σj = cjSKj + αP . (3.2)
where 〈σj , cj〉 is the digital signature on the message M . The broadcast message is
now concatenated in the form of
〈IDj, ti,M, σj, cj〉 . (3.3)
Upon receiving the message in (3), each sensor node verifies the authenticity in
the following way: It checks the time-stamp of current time interval ti and determines
whether the received message is fresh. Then, if the time-stamp is correct, the sensor
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node further computes,
θ′ = e (σj , P ) e(H (IDj‖ ti) ,−Ppub)
cj . (3.4)
Using the time-stamp of current time interval ti and a random α for deriving θ
′,
the sensor node does the bilinear transformation and mapping from θ′ to θ. We should
have the formula below if the received message is authentic:
θ′ = e (σj , P ) e(H (IDj‖ ti) ,−Ppub)
cj
= e (σj , P ) e(H (IDj‖ ti) ,−τP )
cj
= e (cjSKj + αP, P ) e(H (IDj‖ ti) , τP )
−cj
= e (cjSKj + αP, P ) e(τH (IDj‖ ti) , P )
−cj
= (e(SKj, P )
cje(P, P )α) e(τH (IDj‖ ti) , P )
−cj
= e(SKj, P )
cje(P, P )αe(SKj , P )
−cj
= e(P, P )α
= θ
(3.5)
Then, if h (M ‖ti ‖θ
′ ) = h (M ‖ti ‖θ ) = cj , which is equal to that in the received
message, the sensor node considers the received message authentic, and propagates
the message to the next hop or user. If the verification above fails, the sensor node
considers the message as a bogus or replaced one, even a mistaken one, and ignores it.
3.5.2.2 Operation of routing protocol
Those who decide to become CHs broadcast an advertisement message (adv) to all
sensor nodes in the network, which is concatenated with the digital signature. In step
3, the nodes that decide to be leaf nodes pick a CH to join in, which based on the
largest received signal strength of adv messages, then, communicate with the CH by
sending a join request (join) message. After the processes above, in step 4, the CHs
broadcast an allocation message to their cluster members for communication during
the steady-state phase, which includes a time slot schedule (sched) by TDMA control,
yet to be concatenated with the digital signature.
Table 3.1 shows the whole operations in SRIS. The set-up phase consists of four
steps, from step 1 to 4. During the set-up phase of a new round, the BS first broadcasts
its ID and the denotation of the start time of the current round Ts, and a nonce (number
used once) to all sensor nodes. Then the sensor nodes decide whether to become a
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Table 3.1: Operation of the protocol
Set-up phase
1. BS ⇒ Gs : 〈IDBS , Ts, nonce〉
/* The BS broadcasts its information to all nodes. */
2. CHi ⇒ Gs : 〈IDi, Ts, adv, σi, ci〉
/* The elected CHs broadcast their information. */
3. Lj → CHi : 〈IDj , Ts, IDj , join, σj , cj〉
/* A leaf node joins a cluster of the CH i. */
4. CHi ⇒ Gs : 〈IDi, Ts, sched(. . . , IDj/ti, . . .), σi, ci〉
/* A CH broadcasts the schedule message to its members. */
Steady-state phase
5. Lj → CHi : 〈IDj , ti,M, σj , cj〉
/* A leaf node j transmits the sensed data to its CH i. */
6. CHi → BS : 〈IDi, Ts, F, σi, ci〉
/* A CH i transmits the aggregated data to the BS. */
⇒,→ : Broadcast and unicast transmission.
Lj, CHi, Gs : A leaf node, a CH, and the set of all sensor nodes in the network.
Ts, ti : Time-stamps of the time slot for transmission.
ID : The ID of a sensor node.
M,F : Sensed data and aggregated data.
adv,join,sched : Message string types.
〈σ, c〉 : The digital signature concatenated with data.
CH for the current round, based on the threshold T (n), and compare the with the
pre-determined random number from 0 to 1, which is set as follows:
T (n) =
ρ
1− ρ×
(
r mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋) ∀n ∈ Gn
T (n) = 0 ∀n /∈ Gn
(3.6)
ρ is a priori determined value which represents the desired percentage of CHs during
a round (e.g. ρ = 10%), r is the round number of the current round, and G is the
set of nodes that have not been CH nodes in the last ⌊1/ρ⌋ rounds. If the value of
determined number is less than the threshold, the sensor node elects itself as a CH.
Once set-up phase is over, the network system turns into the steady-state phase,
in which sensed data are transmitted from sensor nodes to the BS. First, according
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to the time slot schedule in step 4, each leaf sensor node j transmits the data M in
a packet 〈IDj , ti,M, σj , cj〉 to its CH, which is concatenated with a digital signature
in a time slot. Then, each CH sensor node collects messages from all members in its
cluster, aggregates and fuses these data. Finally, in step 6, CHs send the aggregated
data F to the BS. The steady-state phase consists of multiple reporting cycles of data
transmissions from leaf nodes to the CHs, and is exceedingly long compared to the
set-up phase.
3.5.3 Security Analysis
The proposed SRIS protocol provides different types of security services to the
communications, in both set-up phase and steady-state phase. The encryption of
the message provides confidentiality, the hash function provides integrity, using time
interval time-stamps and the nonce provides freshness. Thus on the whole, SRIS
provides confidentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation, integrity and freshness. Using
the ID-based digital signature authentication has at least two advantages: First, it
eliminates the utilizing of certificate and auxiliary authentication information. Also,
because only the compromised node IDs have to be stored, it requires very small
storage space for the nodes’ revocation, since the length of a user ID is only 2 bytes.
However, the disadvantages of this ID-based digital signature are also obvious because
of the high-computation cost for bilinear transformation in pairing.
Focusing on the resilience to the certain attacks in CWSNs, such as sinkhole
attacks, hello flood attacks and selective forwarding attacks, the routing protocol works
well. All the three kinds of attacks are pointed to CHs of acting as intermediary nodes,
because the leaf nodes make no sense of being attacked in cluster-based structure. Since
attackers do not have valid digital signature to concatenate with broadcast messages
for authentication, attackers cannot pretend as the BS or CHs to trigger attacks.
Therefore, during both the set-up phase and the steady-state phase, the proposed
secure routing is resilient and robust to sinkhole and selective forwarding attacks.
Together with round rotating mechanism and digital signature scheme, SRIS is resilient
to hello flood attacks to CHs. Because the CHs being attacked are capable to ignore
all the communication packets with bogus node ID or bogus digital signature.
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3.6 Protocol Evaluation
In this section, we focus on the energy consumption spent on the message propagation
and computation. We use the network simulator OMNeT++ [45] to simulate the
proposed SRIS protocol.
3.6.1 Message Size
We do the quantitative calculation in this subsection. In the proposed SRIS protocol,
the total message packet size of during the transmissions which is added in formula
(3.3) in section V equals to
|IDj |+| ti |+|M |+|σj |+|h(M ||ti||θ)|.
Where, |h(M ||ti||θ)| is a hash value, which is 20 bytes when SHA-1 is used. |IDj | + |ti|
are very small like 2 bytes by each, and |M | is assumed as 20 bytes. The total message
size of a transmission packet is 44 + |σj | bytes, whereas, |σj | is variable. For example,
when using the Tate pairing [38], the elliptic curve E is defined over Fp, the order q of
G1 and G2 is a 160-bit prime. Moreover, p could be a 512-bit prime to achieve higher
level of security as 1024-bit RSA [35], and G is a q-order multiplicative subgroup of
the finite field F∗p2.
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We compare the proposed secure routing protocol with two other existing secure
routing protocols which are using symmetric key management, SecLEACH [9] and
Multi-level µTesla based protocol [46]. Figure 3.2 shows the total message sizes in
different protocols for data transmission, concerning the number of sensor nodes. We
can see that the proposed ID-based secure routing protocol has smaller message size
than multi-level µTesla based protocol. At the same time, it generates larger message
size as compared to SecLEACH, however, the orphan node problem is fully solved in
the proposed ID-based secure routing protocol.
3.6.2 Simulation Results
Comprehending the extra energy consumption by the auxiliary security overhead and
prolonging the network lifetime are essential in the proposed SRIS protocol. In order
to evaluate the energy consumption of the security overhead in SRIS, we consider two
metrics for the performance evaluation: the number of alive nodes. The ability of
sensing and collecting information in a WSN depends on the set of alive nodes (nodes
that have not failed). Therefore, we evaluate the functionality of the WSN depending
on counting the number of alive nodes in the network. For the performance evaluation,
we compare SRIS with LEACH protocol [16].
In the simulation experiments, we use a network where 100 nodes were randomly
distributed in a 100m× 100m area, with a fixed BS located near the sensing field, and
all sensor nodes periodically sense events and transmit the data packet to the BS, as
shown in Figure 3.3. For the simulations, we use the same radio energy model in [16]
that is based on the practical sensor nodes (e.g., MPR2400CB [47]). The initial energy
of each sensor node is 1J , and the BS has unlimited energy. Meanwhile, we set the
proper desired percentage of CH nodes ρ = 10% during one round. The communication
energy parameter, electronics energy and computation cost are set as: Eelec=50nJ/bit,
transmit amplifier is set as: Eamp=100pJ/bit/m
2, and the energy for data aggregation
is set as: Eaggr = 5nJ/bit. Furthermore, for computation cost for digital signature,
the energy consumption of bilinear transformation and pairing is Epair=25.5nJ/pair,
and the energy consumption on hash operations is Ehash=7.6nJ/function. Moreover,
the hop-wise energy consumption on sending a message is |byte × 59.2µJ |, and the
energy consumption on receiving a message is |byte × 28.6µJ |. (Some of the energy
consumption parameters in the simulation are referred to [16, 35, 48–50].)
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Figure 3.3: An illustration of simulation topology for SRIS
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Figure 3.4 shows the comparison of system lifetime using the proposed SRIS
protocol versus the LEACH protocol [16] for CWSNs. The results demonstrate that
SRIS consumes energy faster than LEACH protocol, which indicates that, the sensor
nodes in the proposed SRIS protocol exhaust faster, because of the communication
overhead and the pairing computation cost for the ID-based digital signature.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a novel Secure Routing protocol (SRIS) for CWSNs
using ID-based Signature. The proposed SRIS protocol is efficient in communication,
and it achieves the security requirements in routing for cluster-based WSNs. However,
the simulation results point out the issues in the proposed SRIS that, the extra energy
consumption by computation of the auxiliary security overhead is still large. This work
has been summarized and published in the proceedings of IEEE GLOBECOM [51].
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Secure and Efficient Data
Transmission Protocols for CWSNs
In this chapter, we study a secure data transmission for cluster-based WSNs (CWSNs),
where the clusters are formed dynamically and periodically. We propose two Secure
and Efficient data Transmission (SET) protocols for CWSNs, called SET-IBS and SET-
IBOOS, by using the Identity-Based digital Signature (IBS) scheme and the Identity-
Based Online/Oﬄine digital Signature (IBOOS) scheme, respectively. In SET-IBS,
security relies on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem in the pairing domain.
SET-IBOOS further reduces the computational overhead for protocol security, which
is crucial for WSNs, while its security relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm
problem. We show the feasibility of the SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS protocols with
respect to the security requirements and security analysis against various attacks. The
calculations and simulations are provided to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed
protocols. The results show that, the proposed protocols have better performance than
the existing secure protocols for CWSNs, in terms of security overhead and energy
consumption.
4.1 Introduction
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a network system comprised of spatially dis-
tributed devices using wireless sensor nodes to monitor physical or environmental
conditions, such as sound, temperature, and motion. The individual nodes are capable
of sensing their environments, processing the information data locally, and sending
data to one or more collection points in a WSN [25]. Efficient data transmission is
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one of the most important issues for WSNs. Meanwhile, many WSNs are deployed in
harsh, neglected and often adversarial physical environments for certain applications,
such as military domains and sensing tasks with trustless surroundings [6]. Secure and
efficient data transmission is thus especially necessary and is demanded in many such
practical WSNs.
4.1.1 Background and Motivations
Cluster-based data transmission in WSNs, has been investigated by researchers in
order to achieve the network scalability and management, which maximizes node
lifetime and reduce bandwidth consumption by using local collaboration among sensor
nodes [8]. In a cluster-based WSN (CWSN), every cluster has a leader sensor node,
regarded as cluster-head (CH). A CH aggregates the data collected by the leaf nodes
(non-CH sensor nodes) in its cluster, and sends the aggregation to the base station
(BS). The LEACH (Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) protocol presented by
Heinzelman et al. [15, 16] is a widely known and effective one to reduce and balance the
total energy consumption for CWSNs. In order to prevent quick energy consumption of
the set of CHs, LEACH randomly rotates CHs among all sensor nodes in the network,
in rounds. LEACH achieves improvements in terms of network lifetime. Following the
idea of LEACH, a number of protocols have been presented such as APTEEN [26] and
PEACH [27], which use similar concepts of LEACH. In this chapter, for convenience,
we call this sort of cluster-based protocols as LEACH-like protocols. Researchers
have been widely studying CWSNs in the last decade in the literature. However, the
implementation of the cluster-based architecture in the real world is rather complicated
[52].
Adding security to LEACH-like protocols is challenging, because they dynami-
cally, randomly and periodically re-arrange the network’s clusters and data links [9].
Therefore, providing steady long-lasting node-to-node trust relationships and common
key distributions are inadequate for LEACH-like protocols (most existing solutions
are provided for distributed WSNs, but not for CWSNs). There are some secure
data transmission protocols based on LEACH-like protocols, such as SecLEACH [9],
GS-LEACH [13] and RLEACH [53]. Most of them, however, apply the symmetric key
management for security, which suffers from a so-called orphan node problem [14]. This
problem occurs when a node does not share a pairwise key with others in its preloaded
key ring. In order to mitigate the storage cost of symmetric keys, the key ring in a
node is not sufficient for it to share pairwise symmetric keys with all of the nodes in
a network. In such a case, it cannot participate in any cluster, and therefore, has to
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elect itself as a CH. Furthermore, the orphan node problem reduces the possibility
of a node joining with a CH, when the number of alive nodes owning pairwise keys
decreases after a long-term operation of the network. Since the more CHs elected by
themselves, the more overall energy consumed of the network [16], the orphan node
problem increases the overhead of transmission and system energy consumption by
raising the number of CHs. Even in the case that a sensor node does share a pairwise
key with a distant CH but not a nearby CH, it requires comparatively high energy to
transmit data to the distant CH.
The feasibility of the asymmetric key management has been shown in WSNs
recently, which compensates the shortage from applying the symmetric key manage-
ment for security [54]. Digital signature is one of the most critical security services
offered by cryptography in asymmetric key management systems, where the binding
between the public key and the identification of the signer is obtained via a digital
certificate [55]. The Identity-Based digital Signature (IBS) scheme [36], based on the
difficulty of factoring integers from Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC), is to derive
an entity’s public key from its identity information, e.g., from its name or ID number.
Recently, the concept of IBS has been developed as a key management in WSNs for
security. Carman [42] first combined the benefits of IBS and key pre-distribution set
into WSNs, and some papers appeared in recent years [24, 51, 56]. The IBOOS scheme
has been proposed in order to reduce the computation and storage costs of signature
processing. A general method for constructing online/oﬄine signature schemes was
introduced by Even et al. [57]. The IBOOS scheme could be effective for the key
management in WSNs. Specifically, the oﬄine phase can be executed on a sensor node
or at the BS prior to communication, while the online phase is to be executed during
communication. Some IBOOS schemes are designed for WSNs afterwards, such as [58]
and [59]. The oﬄine signature in these schemes, however, is precomputed by a third
party and lacks reusability, thus they are not suitable for CWSNs.
4.1.2 Contributions and Organization
Previously in Chapter 3, we have applied and evaluated the key management of IBS
to routing in CWSNs [51]. In this chapter, we extend our previous work and focus on
providing an efficient secure data communication for CWSNs. The contributions of
this work are as follows.
• We propose two Secure and Efficient data Transmission (SET) protocols for
CWSNs, called SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, by using the IBS scheme and the
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IBOOS scheme, respectively. The key idea of both SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS
is to authenticate the encrypted sensed data, by applying digital signatures to
message packets, which are efficient in communication and applying the key
management for security. In the proposed protocols, secret keys and pairing
parameters are distributed and preloaded in all sensor nodes by the BS initially,
which overcomes the key escrow problem described in ID-based crypto-systems
[35].
• Secure communication in SET-IBS relies on the ID-based cryptography, in
which, user public keys are their ID information. Thus, users can obtain the
corresponding private keys without auxiliary data transmission, which is efficient
in communication and saves energy.
• SET-IBOOS is proposed in order to further reduce the computational overhead
for security using the IBOOS scheme, in which security relies on the hardness
of the discrete logarithmic problem. Both SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS solve the
orphan node problem in the secure data transmission with a symmetric key
management.
• We show the feasibility of the proposed protocols with respect to the security
requirements and analysis against three attack models. Moreover, we compare
the proposed protocols with the existing secure protocols for efficiency by
calculations and simulations respectively, with respect to both computation and
communication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
network architecture, security vulnerabilities and objectives. Section 4.3 introduces
the IBS and IBOOS schemes for CWSNs. Section 4.4 and 4.5 present the details of
the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, respectively, and Section 4.6 presents the
protocol features and characteristics. Section 4.7 analyzes and evaluates the proposed
SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS. The last section concludes this work.
4.2 System Description and Protocol Objectives
This section presents the network architecture, security vulnerabilities and protocol
objectives.
Chapter 4 33
4.2.1 Network Architecture
Consider a CWSN consisting of a fixed base station (BS) and a large number of wireless
sensor nodes, which are homogeneous in functionalities and capabilities. We assume
that the BS is always reliable, i.e., the BS is a trusted authority (TA). Meanwhile, the
sensor nodes may be compromised by attackers, and the data transmission may be
interrupted from attacks on wireless channel. In a CWSN, sensor nodes are grouped
into clusters, and each cluster has a cluster-head (CH) sensor node, which is elected
autonomously. Leaf (non-CH) sensor nodes, join a cluster depending on the receiving
signal strength and transmit the sensed data to the BS via CHs to save energy. The
CHs perform data fusion, and transmit data to the BS directly with comparatively high
energy. In addition, we assume that, all sensor nodes and the BS are time synchronized
with symmetric radio channels, nodes are distributed randomly, and their energy is
constrained.
In CWSNs, data sensing, processing and transmission consume energy of sensor
nodes. The cost of data transmission is much more expensive than that of data
processing. Thus, the method that the intermediate node (e.g., a CH) aggregates data
and sends it to the BS is preferred, than the method that each sensor node directly
sends data to the BS [8, 25]. A sensor node switches into sleep mode for energy saving
when it does not sense or transmit data, depending on the TDMA (time division
multiple access) control used for data transmission. In this chapter, the proposed
SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS are both designed for the same scenarios of CWSNs above.
4.2.2 Security Vulnerabilities and Protocol Objectives
The data transmission protocols for WSNs, including cluster-based protocols (LEACH-
like protocols), are vulnerable to a number of security attacks [6, 12]. Especially,
attacks to CHs in CWSNs could result in serious damage to the network, because data
transmission and data aggregation depend on the CHs fundamentally. If an attacker
manages to compromise or pretend to be a CH, it can provoke attacks such as sinkhole
and selective forwarding attacks, hence disrupting the network. On the other hand, an
attacker may intend to inject bogus sensing data into the WSN, e.g., pretend as a leaf
node sending bogus information towards the CHs. Nevertheless, LEACH-like protocols
are more robust against insider attacks than other types of protocols in WSNs [12]. It is
because CHs are rotating from nodes to nodes in the network by rounds, which makes
it harder for intruders to identify the routing elements as the intermediary nodes and
attack them. The characteristics of LEACH-like protocols reduce the risks of being
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attacked on intermediary nodes, and make it harder for an adversary to identify and
compromise important nodes (i.e., CH nodes).
The goal of the proposed secure data transmission for CWSNs is to guarantee
a secure and efficient data transmission between leaf nodes and CHs, as well as
transmission between CHs and the BS. Meanwhile, most of existing secure transmission
protocols for CWSNs in the literature [9, 13, 53], however, apply the symmetric
key management for security, which suffers from the orphan node problem that is
introduced in Section 4.1. In this chapter, we aim to solve this orphan node problem by
using the ID-based crypto-system that guarantees security requirements, and propose
SET-IBS by using the IBS scheme. Furthermore, SET-IBOOS is proposed to reduce
the computational overhead in SET-IBS with the IBOOS scheme.
4.3 IBS and IBOOS for CWSNs
In this section, we introduce the IBS scheme and IBOOS scheme used in the paper.
Note that the conventional schemes are not specifically designed for CWSNs. We adapt
the conventional IBS scheme for CWSNs by distributing functions to different kinds
of sensor nodes, based on [37] at first. In order to further reduce the computational
overhead in the signing and verification process of the IBS scheme, we adapt the
conventional IBOOS scheme for CWSNs, based on [59].
In a finite cyclic group G of prime order q, there exists an element g as the gener-
ator and elements gx∈G, such that, G=〈 g 〉=
{
gx | x ∈ Z∗q={1, 2, . . . , q−1}
}
, where,
Z∗q is a multiplicative group consisting of q−1 integers, in which the multiplication
operation in the group ends in the remainder on the division by q (mod q) [60]. The
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [43] in the cyclic group G is to compute x, in
which the computational complexity is believed to be hard, where the security in the
IBOOS scheme is based on the DLP in this work.
4.3.1 Pairing for IBS
For self-contained, we briefly review the characteristics of pairing. Boneh and Franklin
[35] introduced the first functional and efficient ID-based encryption scheme based on
bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. Specifically, randomly select two large primes p
and q, and let E/Fp indicate an elliptic curve y
2 = x3 + ax + b (4a3 + 27b2 6= 0) over
a finite field Fp. We denote by G1 a q-order subgroup of the additive group of points
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in E/Fp, and G2 a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group in the finite field F
∗
p.
The pairing is a mapping e : G1×G1 → G2, which is a bilinear map with the following
properties.
1. Bilinear : ∀ P,Q,R, S ∈ G1, e (P +Q,R+ S)=e (P,R)e (P, S)e (Q,R) e (Q, S).
In the same way, ∀ c, d ∈ Z∗q , e (cP, dQ)=e (P, dQ)
c=e (cP,Q)d=e (P,Q)cd, etc.
2. Non-degeneracy : If P is a generator of G1, then e (P, P ) is a generator of G2.
3. Computability : There is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P,Q) in G2, ∀
P,Q ∈ G1.
The security in the IBS scheme is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
(DHP) in the pairing domain [55], and the hardness of DHP is defined in [35]. A
bilinear map e is secure if, given g,G,H ∈ G1, it is hard to find h ∈ G1 such that
e (h,H) = e (g,G) [61]. Weil pairing [35] and Tate pairing [38] are the examples of such
bilinear mapping, which present comprehensive descriptions of how pairing parameters
can be selected for security.
The notations used in the following are listed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: List of notations in IBS and IBOOS procedure
msk master key
param public parameters for the PKG
sekID private key generated from an ID and the master key
t time-stamp indicating the current time
θ signing key used for signature signing and verification
SIG digital signature generated from an IBS scheme
SIGoﬄine oﬄine digital signature generated from an IBOOS scheme
SIGonline online digital signature generated using the SIGoﬄine
4.3.2 IBS Scheme for CWSNs
An IBS scheme implemented for CWSNs consists of the following operations, specifi-
cally, setup at the BS, key extraction and signature signing at the data sending nodes,
and verification at the data receiving nodes.
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• Setup: The BS (as a trust authority) generates a master key msk and public
parameters param for the private key generator (PKG), and gives them to all sensor
nodes.
• Extraction: Given an ID string, a sensor node generates a private key sekID
associated with the ID using msk.
• Signature signing : Given a message M , time-stamp t and a signing key θ, the
sending node generates a signature SIG.
• Verification: Given the ID, M and SIG, the receiving node outputs “accept” if
SIG is valid, and outputs “reject” otherwise.
The detailed description of an original IBS scheme from [37] is given in Appendix
A.1.
4.3.3 IBOOS Scheme for CWSNs
An IBOOS scheme implemented for CWSNs consists of following four operations,
specifically, setup at the BS, key extraction and oﬄine signing at the CHs, online
signing at the data sending nodes, and verification at the receiving nodes.
• Setup: Same as that in the IBS scheme.
• Extraction: Same as that in the IBS scheme.
• Oﬄine signing : Given public parameters and time-stamp t, the CH sensor node
generates an oﬄine signature SIGoﬄine, and transmit it to the leaf nodes in its cluster.
• Online signing : From the private key sekID, SIGoﬄine and messageM , a sending
node (leaf node) generates an online signature SIGonline.
• Verification: Given ID, M and SIGonline, the receiving node (CH node) outputs
“accept” if SIGonline is valid, and outputs “reject” otherwise.
The detailed description of an original IBOOS scheme from [59] is given in
Appendix A.4.
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4.4 The Proposed SET-IBS Protocol
In this chapter, we propose two novel Secure and Efficient data Transmission (SET)
protocols for CWSNs, called SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, by using the IBS scheme
and the IBOOS scheme, respectively. We first present SET-IBS in this section.
The proposed SET-IBS has a protocol initialization prior to the network deploy-
ment and operates in rounds during communication, which consists of a setup phase
and a steady-state phase in each round. We introduce the protocol initialization,
describe the key management of the protocol by using the IBS scheme, and the protocol
operations afterwards.
4.4.1 Protocol initialization
In SET-IBS, time is divided into successive time intervals as other LEACH-like
protocols. We denote time-stamps by Ts for BS-to-node communication and by tj
for leaf-to-CH communication. Note that key pre-distribution is an efficient method
to improve communication security, which has been adapted in WSNs in the literature
[9, 13, 24, 42, 51, 53, 56, 62]. In this chapter, we adopt ID||t as user’s public key under
an IBS scheme [37], and propose a novel secure data transmission protocol by using
IBS specifically for CWSNs (SET-IBS). The corresponding private pairing parameters
are preloaded in the sensor nodes during the protocol initialization. In this way, when a
sensor node wants to authenticate itself to another node, it does not have to obtain its
private key at the beginning of a new round. Upon node revocation, the BS broadcasts
the compromised node IDs to all sensor nodes, each node then stores the revoked IDs
within the current round. We adopt the additively homomorphic encryption scheme
in [63] to encrypt the plaintext of sensed data, in which a specific operation performed
on the plaintext is equivalent to the operation performed on the ciphertext. Using this
scheme allows efficient aggregation of encrypted data at the CHs and the BS, which
also guarantees data confidentiality. In the protocol initialization, the BS performs the
following operations of key pre-distribution to all the sensor nodes.
• Generate an encryption key k for the homomorphic encryption scheme to encrypt
data messages, where k ∈ [m− 1], m is a large integer.
• Generate the pairing parameters (p, q,E/Fp,G1,G2, e), as described in Section
4.3. Select a generator P of G1 stochastically.
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• Choose two cryptographic hash functions: H , for the point mapping hash
function which maps strings to elements in G1, and h, for mapping arbitrary
inputs to fixed-length outputs.
• Pick a random integer τ ∈ Z∗q as the master key msk, set Ppub= τP as network
public key.
• Preload each sensor node with the system parameters param =
(k,m, p, q,E/Fp,G1,G2, e, H, h, P, τ).
4.4.2 Key management for security
Assume that a leaf sensor node j transmits a message M to its CH i, and encrypts
the data using the encryption key k from the additively homomorphic encryption
scheme [63]. We denote the ciphertext of the encrypted message as C. We adapt
the algorithms of the IBS scheme from [37] to CWSNs practically and provide the
full algorithm in the signature verification, where security is based on the DHP in the
multiplicative group. The IBS scheme in the proposed SET-IBS consists of following
three operations, extraction, signing and verification.
Extraction: Node j first obtains its private key as sekj = τH(IDj||tj) from msk
and IDj , where IDj is its ID, and tj is the time-stamp of node j’s time interval in the
current round that is generated by its CH i from the TDMA (time division multiple
access) control.
Signature signing: The sensor node j picks a random number αj ∈ Z
∗
q and
computes θj=e(P, P )
αj . The sensor node further computes
cj = h(Cj‖ tj ‖θj ) . (4.1)
Let
σj = cjsekj + αjP , (4.2)
where 〈σj , cj〉 is the digital signature of node j on the encrypted message Cj. The
broadcast message is now concatenated in the form of 〈IDj , tj, Cj, σj , cj〉.
Verification: Upon receiving the message (denoted as 〈ID′j, t
′
j , C
′
j, σ
′
j , c
′
j〉 at the
receiver), each sensor node verifies the authenticity in the following way. It checks the
time-stamp of current time interval t′j and determines whether the received message is
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fresh. Then, if the time-stamp is correct, the sensor node further computes,
θ′j = e
(
σ′j , P
)
e
(
H(ID′j
∥∥ t′j),−Ppub)c′j , (4.3)
using the time-stamp of current time interval t′j. We will have the formula below if
the received message is authentic.
θ′j = e
(
σ′j , P
)
e
(
H(ID′j
∥∥ t′j),−Ppub)c′j
= e (σj , P ) e(H(IDj‖ tj),−τP )
cj
= e (cjsekj + αjP, P ) e(H(IDj‖ tj), τP )
−cj
= e (cjsekj + αjP, P ) e(τH(IDj‖ tj), P )
−cj
= (e(sekj, P )
cje(P, P )αj ) e(τH(IDj‖ tj), P )
−cj
= e(sekj, P )
cje(P, P )αje(sekj, P )
−cj
= e(P, P )αj = θj .
(4.4)
If h
(
C ′j
∥∥t′j ∥∥θ′j ) = h (Cj ‖tj ‖θj ) = c′j , which is equal to that in the received
message, the sensor node considers the received message authentic, and propagates
the message to the next hop or user. If the verification above fails, the sensor node
considers the message as either bogus or a replaced one, even a mistaken one, and
ignores it.
4.4.3 Protocol operation
After the protocol initialization, SET-IBS operates in rounds during communication.
Each round consists of a setup phase and a steady-state phase. We suppose that, all
sensor nodes know the starting and ending time of each round, because of the time
synchronization.
RoundRound
Set-up Steady-state
Time
Frame
Figure 4.1: Operation in the proposed secure data transmission
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Table 4.2: Operations in SET-IBS
Setup phase
Step 1. BS ⇒ Gs : 〈IDbs, Ts, nonce〉
/* The BS broadcasts its information to all nodes. */
Step 2. CHi ⇒ Gs : 〈IDi, Ts, adv, σi, ci〉
/* The elected CHs broadcast their information. */
Step 3. Lj → CHi : 〈IDi, IDj , Ts, join, σj , cj〉
/* A leaf node joins a cluster of the CH i. */
Step 4. CHi ⇒ Gs : 〈IDi, Ts, sched(. . . , IDj/tj , . . .), σi, ci〉
/* A CH i broadcasts the schedule message to its members. */
Steady-state phase
Step 5. Lj → CHi : 〈IDi, IDj , tj , Cj , σj , cj〉
/* A leaf node j transmits the sensed data to its CH i. */
Step 6. CHi → BS : 〈IDbs, IDi, Ts, Fi, σi, ci〉
/* A CH i transmits the aggregated data to the BS. */
- Notations -
⇒,→ : Broadcast and unicast transmission.
Lj , CHi, Gs : A leaf node, a cluster head, and the set of sensor nodes in
the network.
Ts, tj : Time-stamps denoting the time slot for transmission in
setup and steady-state phases.
IDi, IDbs : The IDs of a sensor node i and the BS.
Cj , Fi : The encrypted sensed data of node j and the aggregated
data of CH i.
adv,join,sched : Message string types which denote the advertisement,
join request, and schedule messages.
〈σi, ci〉 : The ID-based digital signature concatenated with data from
node i.
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The operation of SET-IBS is divided by rounds as shown in Figure 4.1, which
is similar to other LEACH-like protocols. Each round includes a setup phase for
constructing clusters from CHs, and a steady-state phase for transmitting data from
sensor nodes to the BS. In each round, the timeline is divided into consecutive time
slots by the TDMA (time division multiple access) control [16]. Sensor nodes transmit
the sensed data to the CHs in each frame of the steady-state phase. For fair energy
consumption, nodes are randomly elected as CHs in each round, and other non-
CH sensor nodes join clusters using one-hop transmission, depending on the highest
received signal strength of CHs. In order to elect CHs in a new round, each sensor node
determines a random number and compares it with a threshold. If the value is less
than the threshold, the sensor node becomes a CH for the current round. In this way,
the new CHs are self-elected based by the sensor nodes themselves only on their local
decisions, therefore, SET-IBS functions without data transmission with each other in
the CH rotations.
Table 4.2 shows the full steps in one round of SET-IBS. The setup phase consists
of four steps, from Step 1 to 4, and the steady-state phase consists of the latter two
steps. In the setup phase, the time-stamp Ts and node IDs are used for the signature
generation. Whereas, in the steady-state phase, the time-stamp tj is used for the
signature generation securing the inner cluster communications, and Ts is used for the
signature generation securing the CHs-to-BS data transmission.
In Step 1, at the beginning of the setup phase of a new round, the BS first
broadcasts its ID, a nonce (number used once), and the denotation of the starting
time Ts of the current round to all sensor nodes, which is used for the signature
signing and verification in the setup phase.
In Step 2, a sensor node decides whether to become a CH for the current round,
based on the threshold T (n) compared with numbers from 0 to 1, which is set as
follows:
T (n) =
ρ
1− ρ×
(
r mod
⌊
1
ρ
⌋) · Ecur (n)
Einit (n)
∀n ∈ Gn,
T (n) = 0 ∀n /∈ Gn.
(4.5)
Equation (4.5) of computing the threshold T (n) in node n is based on the LEACH
protocol [15, 16]. Note that we improve the dynamic clustering algorithm preferably
with multiplying the ratio of residual energy of the current sensor node (i.e., Ecur(n)
Einit(n)
)
to increase the energy efficiency in the clustering, where, Ecur (n) is the current energy,
and Einit (n) is the initial energy of the sensor node. ρ is a priori determined value
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which stands for the desired percentage of CHs during one round (e.g., ρ=10%), r is
the current round number, and Gn is the set of sensor nodes that have not been CHs
in the last ⌊1/ρ⌋ rounds. If the value of determined number is less than the threshold,
the sensor node elects itself as a CH. The sensor node who decides to become a CH
broadcasts the advertisement message (adv) to the neighboring nodes in the network,
which is concatenated with the signature 〈σi, ci〉.
In Step 3, the sensor node, which decides to be a leaf node, picks a CH to join
based on the largest received signal strength of adv messages. Then, it communicates
with CH i by sending a join request (join) message, which is concatenated with the
destination CH’s ID IDi, its own ID IDj , time-stamp Ts, and the digital signature
〈σj , cj〉.
In Step 4, a CH i broadcasts an allocation message to its cluster members
for communication during the steady-state phase, yet to be concatenated with the
signature. The allocation message include a time schedule 〈sched(. . . , IDj/tj, . . .)〉
from the TDMA control, which allocates a time-stamp IDj/tj for a leaf node j.
Once the setup phase is over, the network system turns into the steady-state
phase, in which sensed data is transmitted from sensor nodes to the BS. In Step 5,
according to the TDMA schedule from Step 4, each leaf sensor node j transmits the
encrypted data Cj in a packet 〈IDj, tj, Cj, σj , cj〉 to its CH, which is concatenated with
a digital signature in a time slot tj , where the sender ID IDj with tj is the destination
identifier for the receiver CH. In this way, each CH collects messages from all members
in its cluster, aggregates and fuses data.
In Step 6, CHs send the aggregated data F to the BS, yet to be concatenated with
the digital signature. The steady-state phase consists of multiple reporting cycles of
data transmissions from leaf nodes to the CHs, and is exceedingly long compared to
the setup phase.
4.5 The Proposed SET-IBOOS Protocol
We present the Secure and Efficient data Transmission (SET) protocol for CWSNs by
using IBOOS (SET-IBOOS) in this section. The SET-IBOOS protocol is designed with
the same purpose and scenarios for CWSNs with higher efficiency. The proposed SET-
IBOOS operates similarly to the previous SET-IBS, which has a protocol initialization
prior to the network deployment and operates in rounds during communication. We
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first introduce the protocol initialization, then describe the key management of the
protocol by using the IBOOS scheme, and the protocol operations afterwards.
4.5.1 Protocol initialization
In order to reduce the computation and storage costs of signature signing processing
in the IBS scheme, we improve SET-IBS by introducing IBOOS for security in SET-
IBOOS. The operation of the protocol initialization in SET-IBOOS is similar to that
of SET-IBS, however, the operations of key pre-distribution are revised for IBOOS.
The BS does the following operations of key pre-distribution in the network:
• Generate an encryption key k for the homomorphic encryption scheme to encrypt
data messages, where k ∈ [m− 1], m is a large integer.
• Let G be a multiplicative finite cyclic group with order q. The PKG selects a
random generator g of group G generation, and chooses τ ∈Z∗q at random as the
master key msk.
• For each node j, randomly select rj ∈Z
∗
q for its private key generation, and let
H be a hash function.
• Preload each sensor node j with the public parameters, given by paramj =
(k,m,G, q, g, τ, rj, H).
4.5.2 Key management for security
Assume that a leaf sensor node j transmits a messageM to its CH i, and we denote the
ciphertext of the encrypted message as Cj, which is encrypted by the same encryption
scheme in SET-IBS. We adapt the algorithms from [59] to construct an IBOOS scheme
for CWSNs, where security is based on the DLP in the multiplicative group. The
corresponding private pairing parameters are preloaded in the sensor nodes during the
protocol initialization. The IBOOS scheme in the proposed SET-IBOOS consists of
following four operations, extraction, oﬄine signing, online signing and verification.
Extraction: Before the signature process, node j first extracts the private key
from the msk τ and its identity ID, as sekj=(Rj , sj), where
Rj = g
rj ,
sj = rj +H(Rj, IDj)τ modq.
(4.6)
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Oﬄine signing: At the oﬄine stage, node j generates the oﬄine value 〈σ̂j〉 with
the time-stamp of its time slot tj for transmission, and store the knowledge for signing
online signature when it sends the message. Notice that, this oﬄine signature can be
done by the sensor node itself or by the trustful third party, e.g., the CH sensor node.
Let X=gτ , then,
gsj = grjgH(Rj ,IDj)τ modq = RjX
H(Rj ,IDj) modq.
σ̂j = g
−tj .
(4.7)
Online signing: At this stage, node j computes the online signature 〈σj, zj〉 based
on the encrypted data Cj and the oﬄine signature σ̂j .
hj = H(Cj, IDj).
zj = σ̂j + hjsj modq,
σj = g
σ̂j .
(4.8)
Then node j sends the message to its destination with tj, Rj and the online signature,
in the form of 〈IDj , tj, Rj , σj, zj , Cj〉.
Verification: Upon receiving the message (denoted as 〈ID′j, t
′
j, R
′
j , σ
′
j , z
′
j, C
′
j〉 at
the receiver), each sensor node verifies the authenticity in the following way. It checks
the current time-stamp t′j for freshness. Then, if the time-stamp is correct, the sensor
node further computes the values of gz
′
j and σ′jR
′
j
h′
jXh
′
j
H(R′
j
,ID′
j
) modq, then check if
gz
′
j
?
= σ′jR
′
j
h′
jXh
′
j
H(R′
j
,ID′
j
) modq. (4.9)
For correctness, we will have the formula below if the received message is authentic.
σ′jR
′
j
h′jXh
′
jH(R
′
j ,ID
′
j) modq
= gσ̂jgrjhjgτhiH(Rj ,IDj) modq
= gσ̂j+hj(rj+(H(Rj ,IDj)τ modq))
= gσ̂j+hjsj modq = gz
′
j .
(4.10)
If the value of gzj and σjR
hi
i X
hiH(Ri,IDi) modq are equal from the received message,
the node i considers the received message authentic, accepts it, and propagates the
message to the next hop or user. If the verification above fails, the sensor node considers
the message as either bogus or a replaced one, even a mistaken one, then rejects or
ignores it.
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Table 4.3: Operations in SET-IBOOS
Setup phase
Step 1. BS ⇒ Gs : 〈IDbs, Ts, nonce〉
/* The BS broadcasts its information to all nodes. */
Step 2. CHi ⇒ Gs : 〈IDi, Ts, adv,Ri, σi, zi〉
/* The elected CHs broadcast their information. */
Step 3. Lj → CHi : 〈IDi, IDj , Ts, join,Rj , σj , zj〉
/* A leaf node joins a cluster of CH i. */
Step 4. CHi ⇒ Gs : 〈IDi, Ts, alloc(. . . , IDj/tj , . . .), Ri, σi, zi〉
/* A CH i broadcasts the allocation message. */
Steady-state phase
Step 5. Lj → CHi : 〈IDi, IDj , tj , Cj , Rj , σj , zj〉
/* A leaf node j transmits the sensed data to its CH i. */
Step 6. CHi → BS : 〈IDbs, IDi, Ts, Fi, Ri, σi, zi〉
/* A CH i transmits the aggregated data to the BS. */
- Notations -
⇒,→ : Broadcast and unicast transmission.
Lj , CHi, Gs : A leaf node, a cluster head, and the set of sensor nodes
in the network.
Ts, tj : Time-stamps denoting the time slot for transmission in
setup and steady-state phases.
IDi, IDbs : The IDs of a sensor node i and the BS.
Cj , Fi : The encrypted sensed data of node j and the
aggregated data of CH i.
adv, join, alloc : Message string types which denote the advertisement,
join request, and allocation messages.
〈Ri, σi, zi〉 : The online signature of node i concatenated with data.
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4.5.3 Protocol operation
The proposed SET-IBOOS operates similarly to that of SET-IBS. SET-IBOOS works
in rounds during communication, and the self-elected CHs are decided based on their
local decisions, thus it functions without data transmission in the CH rotations. Table
4.3 shows the full steps of SET-IBOOS in one round, in which the setup phase is from
Step 1 to 4, and the steady-state phase consists of Step 5 and 6.
Step 1 in Table 4.3 is similar to that in Table 4.2. However, the differences in Steps
2, 3 and 4 are the digital signatures which are changed from the ID-based signatures
to the online signatures 〈σi, zi〉 of the IBOOS scheme.
Once the setup phase is over, the network system turns into the steady-state
phase, in which data is transmitted to the BS. The steady-state operates similarly to
that in steps 5 and 6 of Table 4.2, where the ID-based signatures are changed into the
online signatures of the IBOOS scheme.
For convenience, we show a flowchart of the proposed secure data transmission
protocols in Figure 4.2.
Protocol 
initialization
Sensor node
distribution
CH node or 
not?
Broadcast CH
status
Wait for
CH broadcast
Send Join-Request
message to the 
chosen CH
Wait for
Join-Request
messages
Leaf-nodes 
transmit data 
to CHs
CHs transmit 
data to BS
Steady-
state?
Yes No
Yes
No
One round
Figure 4.2: Flowchart of the proposed SET protocols
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4.6 Protocol Features
The protocol characteristics and hierarchical clustering solutions are presented in this
section. We first summarize the features of the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS
protocols as follows.
• Both the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS protocols provide secure data
transmission for CWSNs with concrete ID-based settings, which use ID in-
formation and digital signature for authentication. Thus, both SET-IBS and
SET-IBOOS fully solve the orphan-node problem from using the symmetric key
management for CWSNs.
• The proposed secure data transmission protocols are with concrete ID-based set-
tings, which use ID information and digital signature for verification. Comparing
the SET-IBS, SET-IBOOS requires less energy for computation and storage.
Moreover, the SET-IBOOS is more suitable for node-to-node communications in
CWSNs, since the computation is lighter to be executed.
• In SET-IBOOS, the oﬄine signature is executed by the CH sensor nodes, thus,
sensor nodes do not have to execute the oﬄine algorithm before it wants to sign
on a new message. Furthermore, the oﬄine sign phase does not use any sensed
data or secret information for signing. This is particularly useful for CWSNs,
because leaf sensor nodes do not need auxiliary communication for renewing the
oﬄine signature.
4.6.1 Protocol Characteristics
In this part, we summarize the characteristics of the proposed SET-IBS and SET-
IBOOS protocols. Table 4.4 shows a general summary of comparison of the char-
acteristics of SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS with prior ones, in which metrics are used
to evaluate whether a security protocol is appropriate for CWSNs. We explain each
metric as follows.
• Key management : the key cryptographies used in the protocol to achieve secure
data transmission, which consist of symmetric and asymmetric key based security.
• Neighborhood authentication: used for secure access and data transmission to
nearby sensor nodes, by authenticating with each other. Here, “limited” means the
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Table 4.4: Comparison of characteristics of the proposed protocols with other secure
data transmission protocols
SET-IBS / SET-IBOOS Prior protocols [9, 13, 53]
Key management Asymmetric Symmetric
Orphan node problem Never Frequently occurs
Neighborhood authentication Yes Limited
Storage cost Comparatively low Comparatively high
Network scalability Comparatively high Comparatively low
Communication overhead Deterministic Probabilistic
Computational overhead Comparatively high Low ∼ high
Attack resilience Passive and active attacks on wireless channel
probability of neighborhood authentication, where only the nodes with the shared
pairwise key can authenticate each other.
• Storage cost : represents the requirement of the security keys stored in sensor
node’s memory.
• Network scalability : indicates whether a security protocol is able to scale without
compromising the security requirements. Here, “comparatively low” means that,
compared with SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, in the secure data transmission with a
symmetric key management, the larger network scale increases, the more orphan nodes
appear in the network, and vice versa [6].
• Communication overhead : the security overhead in the data packets during
communication.
• Computational overhead : the energy cost and computation efficiency on the
generation and verification of the certificates or signatures for security.
• Attack resilience: the types of attacks that security protocol can protect against.
4.6.2 Secure Data Transmission with Hierarchical Clustering
In large scale CWSNs, multi-hop data transmission is used for transmission between
the CHs to the BS, where the direct communication is not possible due to the distance
or obstacles between them. The version of the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS
protocols for CWSNs can be extended using multi-hop routing algorithms, to form
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secure data transmission protocols for hierarchical clusters. The solutions to this
extension could be achieved by applying the following two routing models.
1. The multi-hop planar model: A CH node transmits data to the BS by forwarding
its data to its neighbor nodes, in turn the data is sent to the BS. We have proposed
an energy efficient routing algorithm for hierarchically clustered WSNs in [64],
and it is suitable for the proposed secure data transmission protocols.
2. The cluster-based hierarchical method: The network is broken into clustered
layers, and the data packages travel from a lower cluster head to a higher one,
in turn to the BS, e.g., [65].
4.7 Protocol Evaluation
In this section, we first introduce the three attack models of the adversaries, and
provide the security analysis of the proposed protocols against these attacks. We
then present results obtained from calculations and simulations. For the network
simulations, we use the network simulator OMNeT++ 3.0 [45] to simulate SET-
IBS and SET-IBOOS, and we focus on the energy consumption spent on message
propagation and computation.
4.7.1 Security Analysis
In order to evaluate the security of the proposed protocols, we have to investigate the
attack models in WSNs which threaten the proposed protocols, and the cases when
an adversary (attacker) exists in the network. Afterwards, we detail the solutions and
countermeasures of the proposed protocols, against various adversaries and attacks.
4.7.1.1 Attack Models
In this chapter, we group attack models into three categories according to their
attacking means as follows, and study how these attacks may be applied to affect
the proposed protocols.
• Passive attack on wireless channel : Passive attackers are able to perform
eavesdropping at any point of the network, or even the whole communication of the
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network. Thus, they can undertake traffic analysis or statistical analysis based on the
monitored or eavesdropped messages.
• Active attack on wireless channel : Active attackers have greater ability than
passive adversaries, which can tamper with the wireless channels. Therefore, the
attackers can forge, reply and modify messages. Especially in WSNs, various types
of active attacks can be triggered by attackers, such as bogus and replayed routing
information attack, sinkhole and wormhole attack, selective forwarding attack, HELLO
flood attack, and Sybil attack [6, 12].
• Node compromising attack : Node compromising Attackers are the most powerful
adversaries against the proposed protocols as we considered. The attackers can
physically compromise sensor nodes, by which they can access the secret information
stored in the compromised nodes, e.g., the security keys. The attackers also can change
the inner state and behavior of the compromised sensor node, whose actions may be
varied from the premier protocol specifications.
4.7.1.2 Solutions to Attacks and Adversaries
The proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS provide different types of security services to
the communication for CWSNs, in both setup phase and steady-state phase. Both in
SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, the encryption of the message provides confidentiality, the
hash function provides integrity, the nonce and time-stamps provide freshness, and the
digital signature provides authenticity and non-repudiation.
• Solutions to passive attacks on wireless channel : In the proposed SET-IBS and
SET-IBOOS, the sensed data is encrypted by the homomorphic encryption scheme
from [63], which deals with eavesdropping. Thus, the passive adversaries cannot
decrypt the eavesdropped message without the decryption key. Furthermore, both
SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS use the key management of concrete ID-based encryption.
Based on the DHP assumption mentioned in Section 4.3, the ID-based key management
in the proposed protocols is IND-ID-CCA secure (semantic secure against an adaptive
ID-based chosen ciphertext attack) and IND-ID-CPA secure (semantic secure against
an adaptive ID-based chosen plaintext attack). As a result, properties of the proposed
secure data transmission for CWSNs settle the countermeasures to passive attacks.
• Solutions to active attacks on wireless channel : Focusing on the resilience against
certain attacks to CWSNs mentioned in attack models, SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS
work well against active attacks. Most kinds of attacks are pointed to CHs of acting
Chapter 4 51
as intermediary nodes, because of the limited functions by the leaf nodes in a cluster-
based architecture. Since attackers do not have valid digital signature to concatenate
with broadcast messages for authentication, attackers cannot pretend as the BS or
CHs to trigger attacks. Therefore, SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS are resilient, and robust
to the sinkhole and selective forwarding attacks, because the CHs being attacked are
capable to ignore all the communication packets with bogus node IDs or bogus digital
signatures. Together with round-rotating mechanism and digital signature schemes,
SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS are resilient to the hello flood attacks involving CHs.
• Solutions to node compromising attacks: In case of attacks from a node
compromising attacker, the compromised sensor node cannot be trusted anymore to
fulfil the security requirements by key managements. In the case that the node has
been compromised but works normally, the WSN system needs an intrusion detection
mechanism to detect the compromised node [66], and has to replace the compromised
node manually or abandon using it. In this part, we investigate the influence of the
remaining sensor nodes, and evaluate the properties only to that part of the network.
Since each round in the protocol operations terminates in a pre-defined time, SET-
IBS and SET-IBOOS satisfy the property of protocol execution termination, depending
on the local timer of the sensor nodes. The CH nodes are elected based only on their
local decisions, therefore, both SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS operate if there exists an
active or compromising attacker. In order to eliminate the compromised sensor node
in the network, all the revoked IDs of compromised nodes will be broadcast by the
BS at the beginning of the current round. In this way, the compromised nodes can be
prevented from either electing as CHs or joining clusters in this round. Furthermore,
using either the IBS scheme or the IBOOS scheme has at least two advantages. First,
it eliminates the utilization of certificates and auxiliary authentication information.
Therefore, the message overhead for security can be reduced, especially with IBOOS.
Also, because only the compromised node IDs have to be stored, it requires very small
storage space for the node revocation. Since the length of a user’s ID is usually only
1∼2 bytes, the storage of compromised user’s IDs do not require much storage space.
4.7.2 Message Size of Data Transmission
In this part, we do the quantitative calculation of the message packet size on data
transmission in the steady-state (main phase) of the different protocols for comparison.
In the proposed SET-IBS, the message packet size on transmission for node j is
52 Chapter 4
described in Section 4.4, which equals to
|IDi|+ |IDj |+ |tj |+ |Cj|+ |σj |+ |cj|.
cj = |h(Cj||tj||θj)| is a hash value, which is 20 bytes when SHA-1 [44] is used. Although
most of existing WSNs constructed in real world use no more than 200 nodes [25], a
large scale WSN could consist of hundreds of nodes or more in the future. Thus in
this chapter, we set the length of node IDs as 2 bytes. In addition, the time-stamp |tj|
is very small like 1 byte, and |Cj| is assumed as 20 bytes. The total message size of
a transmission packet is 44 + |σj | bytes, whereas, |σj | is variable. For example, when
using the Tate pairing [38] for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), the order q of G1 and
G2 could be a 160-bit prime, if the required security level of ECC is equivalent to RSA
with 1024-bit keys (RSA-1024) [67], which provides the currently accepted security
level. In this way, the total message size of a data packet is 64 bytes in SET-IBS.
Moreover, p could be a 512-bit prime to achieve higher level of security, where G is a
q-order multiplicative subgroup of the finite field F∗p2 [35].
In SET-IBOOS, the message packet size on transmission for node j is described
in Section 4.5, which equals to
|IDi|+ |IDj |+ |tj|+ |Cj|+ |Rj|+ |σj|+ |zj |.
the length of ID and t are same to that of SET-IBS, and |Cj| is assumed as 20 bytes. In
the online signature 〈Rj, σj , zj〉, the length of |z|= |σ̂j +(hsmodq)| depends on the size
of q, which is set to 160 bits long to achieve a similar security level of SET-IBS, because
the oﬄine signature σ̂j is a negative exponential value of the cyclic group G’s generator
g (in Equation 7.1) that is very small. For the other parts of the signature 〈σj , zj〉, |σj|
is the exponentiation to the power σ̂j , from the negative exponential function (−tj ,
in Equation 4.8) of the generator g, thus its value is very small, which is assumed as
2 bytes at most in this chapter. Similarly, the length of Rj is assumed as 2 bytes.
Therefore, the total message size of a data packet is 48 bytes in SET-IBOOS.
We compare the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS with other secure protocols
which use a symmetric key management, SecLEACH protocol[9] and multi-level µTesla
based protocol [46]. We calculate the packet size in these protocols in the same way,
which equals to
|IDj |+ |IDCH |+ |nonce|+ |Cj|+ |mack(IDj|IDCH |nonce|Cj)|,
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in SecLEACH protocol, where mac is the message authentication code. And it equals
to
|IDj|+ |tj|+ |Cj|+ |SigSK {h(IDj |tj |Cj)} |+ |PK|+ |AIj |,
in Multi-level µTesla based protocol, where Sig is the signature based on the secret
key, SK/PK is the public/private key pair for signing and verification, and AI is the
auxiliary information for security referred to the sensor node.
μ
Figure 4.3: Message size for transmission compared to the number of nodes
Figure 4.3 shows the total message sizes in different protocols for data transmis-
sion, which achieve a similar security level to RSA-1024, by concerning the number of
sensor nodes. We can see that the proposed SET-IBS has smaller message size than
multi-level µTesla based protocol. At the same time, it generates larger message size
as compared to SecLEACH. However, the orphan node problem is fully solved in SET-
IBS. We can also see that the proposed SET-IBOOS has the smallest message size than
all the other protocols. We further do network simulations on energy consumption and
computation cost in the next subsection.
4.7.3 Simulation Results
Comprehending the extra energy consumption by the auxiliary security overhead and
prolonging the network lifetime are essential in the proposed SET-IBS and SET-
IBOOS. In order to evaluate the energy consumption of the computational overhead for
security in communication, we consider three metrics for the performance evaluation:
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Network lifetime, system energy consumption and the number of alive nodes. For the
performance evaluation, we compare the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS with
LEACH protocol [16] and SecLEACH protocol [9].
• Network lifetime (the time of FND) - We use the most general metric in this
chapter, the time of FND (first node dies), which indicates the duration that the sensor
network is fully functional [25]. Therefore, maximizing the time of FND in a WSN
means to prolong the network lifetime.
• The number of alive nodes - The ability of sensing and collecting information
in a WSN depends on the set of alive nodes (nodes that have not failed). Therefore,
we evaluate the functionality of the WSN depending on counting the number of alive
nodes in the network.
• Total system energy consumption - It refers to the amount of energy consumed in
a WSN. We evaluate the variation of energy consumption in secure data transmission
protocols.
In the network simulation experiments, 100 nodes are randomly distributed in a
100m× 100m area, with a fixed BS located near part of the area, as shown in Figure
4.4. All the sensor nodes periodically sense events and transmit the data packet to the
BS. We assume that the sensor CPU is a low-power high-performance Intel PXA255
processer of 400 MHz, which has been widely used in many sensor products, e.g.,
Crossbow Stargate [68].
Table 4.5 lists up the parameter settings for the energy consumption in the network
simulations. In the simulations, we use the same radio energy model in [16] that is
based on the practical sensor nodes (e.g., MPR2400CB [47]), and the other parameters
are obtained and estimated from [9, 35, 37, 49, 50, 54, 59, 69]. We assume that the
BS has unlimited energy. For clustering, we properly set the desired percentage of CH
nodes ρ=10% during one round. In addition, on simulating the SecLEACH protocol,
we choose a security level sl=0.98 for a fixed length of a key ring m=100. Thus, the
probability that two nodes will share a key is Ps=0.87, which is also referred to as the
expected orphan rate of the orphan node problem.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the time of FND using different protocols. We apply
confidence intervals to the simulation results, and a certain percentage (confidence
level) is set to 90%. Figure 4.7 shows the comparison of system lifetime using SET-IBS
and SET-IBOOS versus LEACH protocol and SecLEACH protocol. The simulation
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Table 4.5: Parameter settings for the energy consumption in simulations
Node initial energy Einit 1J
Energy consumption on
data aggregation Eaggr
5nJ/bit
Energy consumption on
transmission amplifier Eamp
100pJ/bit/m2
Energy consumption on signature signing
and verification for SET-IBS Esig
77.4µJ/signature
Energy consumption on oﬄine signature
generation for SET-IBOOS Eoﬄine
5µJ/signature
Energy consumption on online signature signing
and verification for SET-IBOOS Eonline
12.37µJ/signature
Hop-wise energy consumption on
sending messages Esend
59.2µJ/byte
Hop-wise energy consumption on
receiving messages Ereceive
28.6µJ/byte
Figure 4.4: An illustration of simulation topology for CWSNs
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results demonstrate that the system lifetime of SET-IBOOS is longer than that of SET-
IBS and SecLEACH protocol. The time of FND in both SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS
is shorter than that of LEACH protocol due to the security overhead on computation
cost of the IBS process.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of FND time in different protocols
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of energy consumption in different protocols
Figure 4.6 illustrates the energy of all sensor nodes disseminated in the network,
which also indicates the balance of energy consumption in the network. Figure 4.7
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shows the comparison of alive nodes’ number, in which the proposed SET-IBS and
SET-IBOOS protocols versus LEACH and SecLEACH protocols. The results demon-
strate that the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS protocols consume energy faster
than LEACH protocol, because of the communication and computational overhead for
security of either IBS or IBOOS process. However, the proposed SET-IBOOS has a
better balance of energy consumption than that of SecLEACH protocol.
Figure 4.7: Comparison of the number of alive nodes in different protocols
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we first reviewed the data transmission issues and the security issues in
CWSNs. The deficiency of the symmetric key management for secure data transmission
has been discussed. We then presented two secure and efficient data transmission
protocols respectively for CWSNs, SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS. In the evaluation
section, we provided feasibility of the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS with respect
to the security requirements and analysis against routing attacks. SET-IBS and SET-
IBOOS are efficient in communication and applying the ID-based crypto-system, which
achieves security requirements in CWSNs, as well as solved the orphan node problem
in the secure transmission protocols with the symmetric key management. Lastly, the
comparison in the calculation and simulation results show that, the proposed SET-IBS
and SET-IBOOS protocols have better performance than existing secure protocols for
CWSNs. With respect to both computation and communication costs, we pointed out
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the merits that, using SET-IBOOS with less auxiliary security overhead is preferred for
secure data transmission in CWSNs. This work has been summarized and published
in the journal of IEEE TPDS [7].
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Chapter 6
An ID-based Authentication
Framework with Adaptive Privacy
Preservation for VANETs
In this chapter, we investigate the authentication with privacy issues in Vehicular Ad
hoc Networks (VANETs). We propose a novel ID-based Authentication framework
with Adaptive Privacy-preservation (IAAP) for VANETs. In IAAP, adaptive self-
generated pseudonyms are used as identifiers instead of real-world IDs. The update of
the pseudonyms depends on vehicular demands. The ID-Based Signature (IBS) scheme
and the ID-Based Online/Oﬄine Signature (IBOOS) scheme are used, for authenti-
cation between the Road Side Units (RSUs) and vehicles, as well as authentication
among vehicles, respectively. System evaluation has been executed using efficient IBS
and IBOOS schemes. It shows that, the proposed IAAP is suitable to the VANET
environment.
6.1 Introduction
A Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) is a technology that employs moving vehicles
as nodes in a network to create a mobile network to provide communication among
nearby vehicles, as well as between vehicles and nearby fixed Road Side Units (RSUs)
[29]. A VANET is considered as a variant form of a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET).
It turns every participating vehicle into a wireless router or node, allows vehicles
in approximately 300 meters range to connect with each other. A VANET thus
creates a wide range wireless network for vehicles and RSUs. As mobile wireless
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devices and wireless networks become increasingly important in recent years, the
demand for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication and Vehicle-to-Roadside (V2R)
communication increases continuously [29][70]. Unlike MANETs, the mobility of
vehicles is constrained by predefined roads in VANETs. The vehicle velocities are
also restricted according to the road speed limits, the congestion level, or the traffic
control mechanisms on roads [70].
A VANET is utilized for a broad range of safety and non-safety applications.
It provides value-added services such as location-based services and infotainment
applications [29]. Security functions must be supported to prevent potential attacks
caused by a vehicle reacting dangerously as a result of receiving erroneous messages.
Since access control is generally based on the identity of vehicle, authentication is
essential to effective security. Especially, the safety applications require a strong
mutual authentication, because most of the safety-related messages may contain life-
critical information.
We are committed to solving the issues of authentication and privacy in VANETs.
There is a number of research work related to the authentication issue in VANETs, and
these studies can be classified into two classes: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based
frameworks and the frameworks using ID-based cryptography. Although many PKI
based authentication frameworks have been proposed (e.g., [98], [11], and [99]), the
system availability will not be pervasive or feasible. Because such frameworks require
additional communication to manage the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), which
causes heavy overheads. Authentication frameworks using ID-based crypto-system
have been proposed to reduce overheads, such as [22], [23], and [24]. In order to reduce
the computational cost in the ID-based Signature (IBS) process for VANETs, the
ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature (IBOOS) scheme is preferable for authentication
in VANETs, which is also an attractive solution. An IBOOS scheme [100] increases
efficiency of pairing process by separating signing process into an oﬄine phase and
an online phase, in which the verification is comparatively more efficient than that of
IBS. Therefore, we propose an authentication framework utilizing both the IBS and
the IBOOS schemes for better performance. In VANETs, the oﬄine phase can be
executed initially at RSUs or vehicles, while the online phase is to be executed in
vehicles during V2V communication.
In VANETs, vehicles do not want their private information such as name, position,
moving route, and user data to be revealed, against illegal tracing and user profiling.
The anonymity of identity should be supported in VANETs. The usage of pseudonyms
that are intimately linked to an original real-world identity (ID), is a superior solution
for privacy preservation to this issue [17]. The pseudonym may be generated by the
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fixed RSUs or the vehicle itself, even can be downloaded from a trusted site periodically,
e.g., [24] and [101]. On the other hand, when traffic accidents or certain crimes occur,
the identity information has to be revealed by the legal authority to establish the
liability of accidents or crimes. VANETs must have a way to validate transmissions
and maintain security while retaining privacy.
In this chapter, we propose a novel ID-based Authentication framework with
Adaptive Privacy-preservation (IAAP) for VANETs. The primary objective of this
work is to provide a privacy-preserving authentication mechanism efficiently in terms
of the processing time, storage and communication overhead. We utilize self-defined
pseudonyms instead of real-world IDs without exposing vehicle privacy. Different from
other pre-store schemes (e.g., [24]), an ID pool of regional RSUs is preloaded in each
vehicle, because the number of RSUs is comparatively small and does not change
frequently. We utilize the IBS scheme for Vehicle-to-Roadside (V2R) authentication
and Roadside-to-Vehicle (R2V) authentication, and the IBOOS scheme for Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V) authentication. System evaluation shows that, the proposed authen-
tication framework with privacy preservation is efficient and suitable to the VANET
environment. It is a novel research work to handle authentication and privacy issues
in VANETs using IBOOS, and the main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We propose an adaptive pseudonym-based scheme, which use self-generated
pseudonyms instead of real-world IDs to achieve vehicle privacy and traceability.
• We propose an efficient secure framework to realize authentication with adaptive
privacy preservation in VANETs.
• The proposed ID-based authentication framework does not restrict the solution
to the existing IBS and IBOOS schemes, thus can also utilize new IBS and
IBOOS schemes to achieve improved performance.
The rest parts of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the system
description and objectives. Section III introduces the preliminary knowledge related
to this work. In Section IV, we propose a novel ID-based authentication framework
with adaptive privacy preservation for VANETs. Section V provides analysis on
authentication and privacy of the proposed framework, and Section VI evaluates
framework performance. In the last section, we conclude the paper.
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6.2 System Description and Objectives
This section describes components in the framework and the network structure, as well
as the potential threats of VANETs. The objectives are presented afterwards.
6.2.1 Network Structure and Components
Figure 6.1: The illustration of a VANET architecture
A VANET with guaranteed security basically consists of three network compo-
nents [24] as shown in Figure 6.1: Road Side Units (RSUs), vehicles (users) and a
Regional Trusted Authority (RTA). In this chapter, we consider a VANET consisting
of a RTA, finite numbered registered RSUs along roads, and a large number of vehicles
on or by the roads. We suppose that, the RSUs are always reliable, while vehicles
are vulnerable to being compromised by attackers. The wireless communication
in VANETs can be classified mainly into three types, Vehicle-to-Roadside (V2R)
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communication, Roadside-to-Vehicle (R2V) communication, and Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) communication. Other communications are through secure channels, such as
inter-RSU communication and RSU-to-RTA communication.
Concerning security issues, there are kinds of attacks which threaten the V2R
and V2V communication on the road, as we present in the next subsection. The
transmission range of an RSU is assumed to be much longer than that of vehicles. All
vehicles use symmetric radio channel, and tamper-proof modules (TPMs) are mounted
to store sensitive information. The energy of vehicles is adequate and no constrained in
a VANET. The candidates for a RTA are automobile manufacturers, an authenticated
third party of the state, etc. The main responsibilities of a RTA are shown as follows.
• A RTA generates cryptographic key materials for the RSUs and the vehicles in
its region, and delivers these keys to them over secure channels.
• It manages a list of the vehicles of which participations have been revoked,
updates the list periodically, and advertises the list to the network to isolate
the compromised vehicles.
• If a message sent by a vehicle creates a problem on the road, the RTA is
responsible for tracing and identifying the source of the message to resolve the
dispute.
• RTAs at different regions have to be cross-certified. Thus vehicles from different
regions or different manufacturers can authenticate each other via RTAs.
6.2.2 Authentication and Privacy Issues in VANETs
Once the secure communication has been established for VANETs, many attacks can
compromise them. In this Section, we investigate these attacks on authentication and
privacy, and explain how they can be performed and the potential consequences.
Attacks on authentication: There are mainly two following attacks related to
authentication in VANETs as follows [19].
i. Impersonation attack : The attacker pretends to be another entity. It can be
performed by stealing other entity’s credential. As a consequence, some warnings sent
to a specific entity would be sent to an undesired one.
ii. Sybil attack : The attacker uses different identities at the same time. In this
way, e.g., a single attacker could pretend vehicles to report the existence of a false
bottleneck in traffic.
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Attacks on privacy : Attacks on privacy over VANETs are mainly related to
illegally gathering sensitive information about vehicles. As there is a relation between
a vehicle and its driver, exposure of vehicle’s situation could affect its driver privacy
[19].
i. Identity revealing attack : Getting the owner’s identity of a given vehicle could
put its privacy at risk. Usually, a vehicle’s owner is also its driver, so it would simplify
getting personal data about that person.
ii. Location tracking attack : The location of a vehicle in a given moment, or the
path followed during a period of time is considered as personal data. It allows building
that vehicle’s profile and, therefore, tracking its driver.
Mechanisms resisting the attacks on both authentication and privacy are required
in VANETs. They must satisfy the tradeoff between privacy and utility. For the
definition of authentication with privacy preservation for VANETs, we have defined in
Definition 5.2.2 in Chapter 5 below.
6.2.3 Objectives
We endeavor to construct an authentication framework with privacy preservation using
ID-based key management for different kinds of communication in VANETs. For
authentication, the RTA preloads an ID pool of regional RSUs into a vehicle, and
the RSU ID pool does not need to update/replenish unless the RSU ID changes or
increases. For the vehicle privacy, we utilize a form of self-defined pseudonyms as real-
world IDs without exposing privacy. Therefore, a vehicle can change its pseudonym
anytime it wants for privacy preservation. The goal of the proposed authentication
framework is to guarantee the privacy-preserving authentication in VANETs.
6.3 Preliminaries
In a VANET, we utilize IBS schemes for authentication between vehicles and an RSU,
and IBOOS schemes for authentication among vehicles. In this section, we provide the
preliminary knowledge of pairing for ID-based cryptography, as well as the IBS scheme
and the IBOOS scheme for authentication, respectively.
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6.3.1 Pairing for ID-based Cryptography (IBC)
ID-based crypto-system allows the public key of an entity to be derived from its
public identity information such as name, email address, etc, which avoids the use
of certificates for public key verification in the conventional PKI. Most of the proposed
IBS and IBOOS schemes are based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP)
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in the pairing domain [29], where the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) for pairing in groups is required to be hard. We briefly
review the characteristics of pairing. Randomly select two large primes p and q, and
let E/Fp indicate an elliptic curve over the finite field Fp. We denote by G1 a q-order
subgroup of the additive group of points in E/Fp, and G2 a q-order subgroup of the
multiplicative group in the finite field F∗p [35]. The pairing is a mapping e : G1 × G1
→ G2, which is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties.
1. Bilinear : ∀ P,Q ∈ G1 and ∀ c, d ∈ Z
∗
q, e (cP, dQ) = e (P, dQ)
c = e (cP,Q)d =
e (P,Q)cd, etc.
2. Non-degeneracy : If P is a generator of G1, then e (P, P ) is a generator of G2.
3. Computability : There is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P,Q) in G2, ∀P,Q ∈
G1.
Here Z∗q is the multiplicative group consisting of q − 1 integers. Weil pairing [35]
and Tate pairing [38] are the examples of such bilinear mapping, which present
comprehensive descriptions of how pairing parameters can be selected for security.
6.3.2 ID-based Signature (IBS)
An IBS scheme consists of four steps including setup, key extraction, signature signing
and verification [36].
• Setup: The RTA computes a master key s and public parameters param for the
Private Key Generator (PKG) , and gives param to all vehicles.
• Extraction: Given an ID string, the algorithm generates a private key sekID
associated with the ID using a master key s.
• Signature signing : Given a message M , time-stamp t and a signing key θ, the
algorithm generates a signature SIG.
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• Verification: Given the ID, M and SIG, the verification algorithm outputs
“accept” if SIG is valid, and outputs “reject” otherwise.
6.3.3 ID-based Online/Oﬄine Signature (IBOOS)
An IBOOS scheme consists of five steps including setup, key extraction, oﬄine signing,
online signing and verification [102].
• Setup: Same as that in the IBS scheme.
• Extraction: Same as that in the IBS scheme.
• Oﬄine signing : Given public parameters, the algorithm generates an oﬄine
signature SIG
oﬄine
.
• Online signing : From the input of the private key sekID, the oﬄine signature
SIG
oﬄine
and a message M , the algorithm generates an online signature SIG
online
of M .
• Verification: Given ID, M and SIG
online
, the verification algorithm outputs
“accept” if SIG
online
is valid, and outputs “reject” otherwise.
6.4 Proposed IAAP for VANETs
This section describes the design of the proposed ID-based Authentication framework
with Adaptive Privacy-preservation (IAAP) for VANETs, including protocol initial-
ization and the pseudonym based authentication framework.
6.4.1 Protocol Initialization
In the proposed IAAP, RTAs are set in different regions, e.g., the region can be a city,
a province or a country. Before a vehicle get into the road in a region, the driver first
can drive to the RTA for registration. For each vehicle, the RTA publishes the certified
domain parameters for authentication, given by: param=(G1,G2, q, g, P, s,H), which
are defined in Section IV, andH is the hash function used in the pseudonym generation.
For the purpose of privacy preservation in authentication, vehicles use their self-
generated pseudonyms as identifiers instead of real-world IDs, which plays the same role
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as the identity in the ID-based authentication and secure communications. Meanwhile,
the RTA computes all the hash values of registered vehicles, and stores the hash value
table. Thus, the RTA can query the real-world ID of a vehicle depending on the certain
hash value.
6.4.2 Privacy-preserving Authentication
For privacy preservation, pseudonyms of a vehicle are generated instead of the real-
world ID in authentication process. We define the pseudonym of a vehicle as the
following form.
PSv
def
= RandomNo.||H(IDv)@HR@RSUC , (6.1)
where RandomNo. is a random number generated by the Pseudo-Random Number
Generator (PRNG). H(IDv) is a hash value generated from the vehicle’s real-world
ID. HR denotes the home region where the entity is registered. RSUC denotes the ID
of the current corresponding RSU, where the vehicle generates its new pseudonym for
secure authentication and communication.
According to the components described in Section II, authentication in VANETs
can be divided into three categories, namely Vehicle-to-Roadside (V2R) authentication,
Roadside-to-Vehicle (R2V) authentication and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) authentica-
tion. In the proposed IAAP, RSUs are broadcasting their information periodically,
and all the operations at RTAs and RSUs are tamper-proof and being performed
trustfully. The proposed IAAP operates adaptively, whenever a vehicle wants to newly
authenticate itself to others, or update its current pseudonym. Table 6.1 shows the
operations in IAAP.
6.4.2.1 V2R and R2V Authentication
The V2R and R2V authentication consist of the following three steps. We take an
example in Figure 6.1 to illustrate the authentication between one RSU and a number
of vehicles.
Step 1 : The RSU broadcasts its information periodically. Therefore, the vehicles
in the transmission range can get the RSU’s information 〈IDr, T, adv, nonce〉.
Step 2 : If a vehicle wants to authenticate itself to others or update its pseudonym
in the VANET system, it first uses IBS for V2R authentication. The vehicle unicasts
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Table 6.1: Operations of the proposed IAAP
V2R and R2V authentication
Step 1. RSUr ⇒ ∗ : 〈IDr, T, adv, nonce〉
/* The RSU broadcasts its information. */
Step 2. Vv → RSUr : 〈IDr, PSv , T, join, SIGv(PSv ||T )〉
/* A vehicle authenticates itself to the RSU. */
Step 3. RSUr ⇒ ∗ : 〈IDr, t, set(POI), nonce, SIGR(IDr||t)〉
/* The RSU broadcasts the POI set. */
V2V authentication
Step 1. Vv → Vu : 〈PSu, PSv , t, nonce, SIGv
online
(SIGv
oﬄine
(PSv)||t)〉
/* Vehicles authenticate with each other. */
Cross-RSU V2V authentication
Step 1. Vw → Vu : 〈PSu, PSw, t, nonce, SIGw
online
(SIGw
oﬄine
(PSw)||t)〉
/* Vehicle w authenticates to u. */
Step 2. Vu → RSUr : 〈IDr, PSu, T, q.y., SIGu(PSu||T )〉
/* u queries the RSU for authenticity. */
Step 3. RSUr → Vu : 〈PSu, IDr, T, q.r., nonce, SIGR(IDr||T )〉
/* The RSU replies the query result to u. */
- Notation -
∗ : The all vehicles in the communication range of a RSU.
⇒,→ : The broadcast and unicast communication, respectively.
nonce : The number used once, which provides freshness.
RSU, V : A road side unit, a vehicle in VANETs, respectively.
T, t : The time-stamp used in V2R and R2V authentication, and
the time-stamp used in V2V authentication, respectively.
ID,PS : The real-world ID and the pseudonym of a vehicle,
respectively.
SIG : The digital signature generated using IBS.
SIG
online
, SIG
oﬄine
: The online and oﬄine digital signature respectively
generated using IBOOS.
adv, join, set, q.y., q.r. : The message string types which denote the advertisement,
the join request, the POI set messages, the query messages,
and the query result, respectively.
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its new pseudonym for the RSU in the message 〈IDr, PSv, T, join, SIGv(PSv||T )〉, where
IDr indicates the destination RSUr. After receiving the join request message from a
vehicle, the RSU verifies the signature, and accepts it if the message is authenticated.
Step 3 : The RSU first generates the oﬄine signatures SIGv
oﬄine
(PSv) for the
vehicle Vv based on the pseudonym. The RSU then use IBS for R2V authentication,
and broadcasts an allocation set message to all the vehicles in its transmission
range for V2V communication. The allocation message includes a p. seudonym/o.ﬄine
signature/RSU I.D (POI) set in the form of (PSv/SIGv
oﬄine
(PSv)/IDr), attached with a
nonce, yet to concatenated with the digital signature SIGr(IDr||t). Here IDr denotes
the corresponding RSU, where the POI set is generated. All the vehicles in the current
RSU’s transmission range receive the message, and accept if the signature verification
is valid. Then, regarding the acceptable POI according to verification, the vehicle
stores the POI set if its storage is possible, otherwise, drops it.
6.4.2.2 V2V Authentication
During the V2V authentication, vehicles can use the received POI set for secure
communication. On the authentication with the IBOOS scheme, a vehicle first
computes the online digital signature SIGv
online
(SIGv
oﬄine
(PSv)||t), which depends on the
oﬄine signature SIGv
oﬄine
and the time stamp t. Then the vehicle can use the online
signature for the V2V authentication, as shown in Step 4.
6.4.2.3 Cross-RSU V2V Authentication
The cross-RSU V2V authentication is required when a vehicle receives an authentica-
tion message from another vehicle, whose pseudonym does not appear in its storage.
In this case, the vehicle can query the RSU, which consists of the following three steps.
Step 1: We take an example to illustrate this approach, where vehicle w is aiming
to authenticate with vehicle u with its online SIGw
online
.
Step 2: On the receiving authentication message from w, the vehicle u checks
its storage for the pseudonym and the POI set of w. If the information does
not appear in vehicle u’s storage, vehicle u transmits its query message q.y. of
authenticity to the nearest RSU, which includes the POI set of vehicle w in the form
of (PSw/SIGw
oﬄine
(PSw)/IDr), signed with the IBS SIGu.
Step 3 : After receiving the queried message, the current RSU queries other RSUs
or the RTA via secure channels to check if the POI set is authenticated. Afterwards,
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the current RSU replies the query result q.r. back to the querying vehicle u, whether
or not the POI set is authenticated.
6.4.2.4 Cross-region Authentication
When a vehicle enters a new region, first it has to go to the current RTA for registration.
At a RTA, a vehicle can update or replenish its RSU pool and the certified domain
parameters for authentication. When the registration is completed, the vehicle can
proceed with the above V2R, R2V and V2V authentication, and carry on the secure
communication in this region.
6.4.3 Implementation of Proposed Framework
There are many IBS and IBOOS schemes available for the proposed IAAP, mainly
based on ECC and RSA signatures. Verifying RSA signature is efficient for a vehicle
[103], and we can set small verification exponents. However, RSA based signatures are
large, resulting in a considerably increased message size. ECC based signatures are
equally useful for signing and verification of messages and have short signature sizes.
Therefore, for VANETs, ECC based signatures are considered more efficient than RSA
signatures. To exemplify the proposed IAAP, we select the most secure and efficient
ECC based signature schemes from the available IBS and IBOOS schemes. An IBS
scheme given in [37] is preferable for V2R and R2V authentication, security of this
signature scheme depends on ECC and DLP. While as an IBOOS schemes given in
[104] is preferable to satisfy V2V broadcast authentication scheme, where the oﬄine
signature can be securely reused to sign more than one message, and its security also
depends on DLP.
6.5 Analysis on Authentication and Privacy
The proposed IAAP primarily attempts to provide authentication and privacy preser-
vation in VANETs, and resolve the conflicts between them. According to the Definition
5.2.2 in Section III, we analyze authentication and privacy preservation respectively
as follows.
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6.5.1 Authentication
In the proposed IAAP, authentication is guaranteed by digital signatures, which bound
a message to a pseudonym and consequently the corresponding identity. In addition,
digital signature also guarantees non-repudiation of the signer by querying the vehicle’s
real-world ID from the RTA.
6.5.2 Privacy Preservation
The adoption of pseudonyms in VANET communications conceals the real-world
identity of vehicles such that peer vehicles and RSUs cannot identify the sender of
a specific message, meanwhile is still able to authenticate the sender. By frequently
updating the pseudonyms during communication, the proposed IAAP successfully
defends legitimate vehicles against location tracing and user profiling.
In action, the vehicle will interact primarily with the RSUs for Internet access,
or with peer vehicles for information exchange. Since the secure interactions with the
RTA or RSUs are proposed in the proposed IAAP, we can safely claim that attackers
cannot link pseudonyms with the identity to compromise the privacy of an honest
vehicle. By adjusting the length of the update period, the vehicle can control the
achievable privacy by limiting the RSUs’ broadcast of POI sets. As a result, except
for the cases where identities must be revealed to the RTA, no other entities in the
proposed IAAP can compromise the privacy of honest vehicle users.
6.6 Performance Evaluation
This section evaluates the performance and efficiency of the proposed IAAP in terms
of storage requirement and computation efficiency.
6.6.1 Storage Requirement
In the proposed IAAP, the storage requirements on RTAs and RSUs are not stringent
since these entities are distributed and resource-free in nature in VANETs. We are
mainly concerned with the storage cost in vehicles with two respects, the informa-
tion necessary for cryptographic parameters, and the number of POI sets for V2V
authentication.
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In order to gain a high security level in the proposed IAAP, we adopt the
parameters chosen by [11], which results in a security level similar to 2048-bit RSA
and a total storage space of 4.2M bytes. In this scheme, the ECC based PKI was
adopted, which is well-known for its efficient storage and communication performance
compared to the RSA based PKI.
6.6.2 Computation Efficiency
This part gives an estimation of efficiency on applying the proposed IAAP for
VANETs. Although the computationally intensive pairing operations are not involved
in conventional PKI, we believe that the ID-based crypto-system based on pairings is
highly suitable, especially in the VANET environment.
Table 6.2: Comparison of computation efficiency with different cryptographies
Scheme Signature
Energy Cost
(verification) (mW)
Computation time
(online) (ms)
Message size
(byte)
Ref. [37] IBS 26.96 18.10 125+Signature
Ref. [28] IBS 71.90 14.10 42+Signature
Ref. [104] IBOOS negligible negligible 84
Ref. [59] IBOOS 5.62 0.19 64+Signature
Consider that the well-known Tate pairing is used for the basic pairing operation
of the IBS scheme. It is shown in [37] that the time taken for computing a Tate pairing
is 20ms, in the underlying base field of Fp (where |p| = 512-bit), which has a similar
level of security to 1024-bit RSA. The proposed V2V authentication scheme using
IBOOS [104] allows the secure reuse of the oﬄine signature, computed by the RSU.
The only cost a vehicle bears in message signing is the cost of the online phase which
requires two point multiplications in oﬄine phase. This online phase only consists of
integer addition and multiplication operations, which are very efficient for vehicles in
terms of time and energy consumption. Therefore, the time and energy cost of the
online phase is almost negligible. In Table 6.2, we show the efficiency of authentication
with a comparison of using different cryptographic schemes. Here, the computation
time indicates the verification time used for the signature in IBS schemes and the
online signature in IBOOS schemes. Energy cost indicates the energy assumed for
signature verification at the receiving vehicle. The detailed descriptions of the original
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IBS schemes [28, 37] and IBOOS schemes [59, 104] are provided in Appendices A.1 ∼
A.4.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, an ID-based Authentication framework with Adaptive Privacy preser-
vation (IAAP) has been proposed for VANETs, which utilizes IBS and IBOOS schemes
for authentication, and a pseudonym-based scheme for privacy preservation. One of
the advantages of IAAP is its reusability, which means that, it can also be reused with
new IBS and IBOOS schemes for security and performance improvements. This work
has been summarized and published in the proceedings of ComComAp [62].
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, we investigated the criteria for protecting the transmitted data
in the wireless communication, and designed balanced architectures of the network
for the desired requirements such as transmission efficiency, network feasibility and
security. We focused on providing security to the data communication in WSNs and
VANETs based on the authentication service. One of the goals of this dissertation is
to guarantee a secure and efficient data transmission between leaf nodes and CHs, as
well as transmission between CHs and the BS in cluster-based WSNs (CWSNs). More
over, we endeavor to construct an efficient authentication framework for security, by
using the vehicular pseudonyms and ID-based key management for different kinds of
communication in VANETs.
In this chapter, we summarize the dissertation and present the future research as
follows.
8.1 Dissertation Conclusions
In Chapter 3, we introduced a novel Secure Routing protocol for CWSNs using ID-
based Signature (SRIS). The proposed SRIS protocol is efficient in communication, and
it achieves the security requirements in routing for CWSNs. However, the simulation
results point out the issues in the proposed protocol that, the extra energy consumption
by computation of the auxiliary security overhead is still large.
In Chapter 4, we presented two Secure and Efficient data Transmission (SET)
protocols respectively for CWSNs, SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS. SET-IBS and SET-
IBOOS are efficient in communication and applying the ID-based crypto-system,
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which achieves security requirements in CWSNs, as well as solved the orphan node
problem in the secure transmission protocols with the symmetric key management.
The comparison in the calculation and simulation results show that, the proposed
SET protocols have better performance than existing secure protocols for CWSNs.
In Chapter 5, we carried out a survey of privacy-preserving authentication (PPA)
schemes for VANETs, and studied the development of PPA. We categorized and
summarized the existing PPA schemes with different aspects in authentication key
cryptographies and privacy preservation mechanisms. We also addressed the open
issues and challenges that can be further investigated in the desired PPA schemes for
VANETs.
In Chapter 6, an ID-based Authentication framework with Adaptive Privacy
preservation (IAAP) has been proposed for VANETs, which utilizes IBS and IBOOS
schemes for authentication, and a pseudonym-based scheme for privacy preservation.
One of the advantages of IAAP is its reusability, which means that, it can also be
reused with new IBS and IBOOS schemes for security and performance improvements.
In Chapter 7, we presented a novel Authentication framework with Conditional
Privacy-preservation and Non-repudiation (ACPN) for VANETs, which utilizes the
IBS and IBOOS schemes for the authentication, the pseudonym-based scheme for the
privacy preservation, and the PKC-based scheme for the pseudonym generation and
the non-repudiation. ACPN achieves the desired authentication, privacy preservation,
non-repudiation and other security objectives for VANETs. Analysis and performance
evaluation show that, the proposed ACPN is feasible and adequate to the VANET
environment.
8.2 Future Research
In this dissertation, the authentication service is utilized in secure communications for
WSNs and VANETs. In the future, two directions of research are considered.
Firstly, we are willing to carry out projects to implement the proposed protocols
on actual wireless devices to obtain results in the real-world WSNs and VANETs.
On the evaluations of the proposed protocols in this dissertation, mostly we test and
prove them through simulations in the network simulators. Although the network
simulators are reliable and dependable, the results from simulations may differ from
the real-world results because of uncertainties in the parameter settlings. Therefore,
the implementation of the research on actual vehicles and sensor nodes is essential in
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the performance evaluations for practical research, even though it may cost a great
deal of money and time.
Secondly, we intend to focus on providing the complete and integrated security
systems for WANETs, which would achieve the whole of the known security require-
ments for wireless communications. So far, many security systems have been proposed
for certain kinds of networks without considering the integration with others. Thus, a
desired security system is needed, which is an integrated security solution for different
kinds of networks in WANETs, including WSNs, VANETs and other subordinative
networks. Meanwhile, the physical security for the wireless devices is also considered,
which is becoming a critical security requirement for WANETs. This way, the damage
from both wireless channel attackers and physical attackers could be alleviated by the
security systems for WANET communications.
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Appendix A
Original Descriptions of the
Adopted IBS and IBOOS Schemes
A.1 An IBS Scheme from Ref. [37]
In this appendix, we provide the detailed description of an IBS scheme. This IBS
scheme is proposed by Hess [37].
Let (G,+) and (V, ·) denote cyclic groups of prime order l with additive and
multiplicative operations, respectively. Select a generator P ∈ G of G, and let e :
G × G → V be a pairing. Furthermore, the author defines two hash functions for
mapping:
h : {0, 1}∗ × V → (Z/lZ)×, H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗,
where (Z/lZ)× forms a quotient group under multiplication modulo l. The IBS scheme
consists of the following four steps, setup, extract, sign and verify.
• Setup: The TA (trusted authority) picks a random integer t ∈ (Z/lZ)×, computes
QTA = tP and publishes QTA, while t is kept secret.
• Extract : This algorithm is performed by the TA when a signer requests the secret
key corresponding to their identity. Suppose the signer’s identity is given by the
string ID. The secret key of the identity is then given by SID = tH(ID), which is
computed by the TA and given to the signer. The extraction step is typically done
once for every identity, and the same setup data is used for different identities.
• Sign: To sign a message m the signer chooses an arbitrary P1 ∈ G
∗, picks a
random integer k ∈ (Z/lZ)× and computes:
1. r = e(P1, P )
k.
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2. v = h(m, r).
3. u = vSID + kP1.
The signature is then the pair (u, v) ∈ (G, (Z/lZ)×).
• Verify : On receiving a message m and signature (u, v) the verifier computes:
1. r = e(u, P ) · e(H(ID),−QTA)
v.
2. Accept the signature if and only if v = h(m, r).
A.2 An IBS Scheme from Ref. [28]
In this appendix, we provide the detailed description of an IBS scheme. This IBS
scheme is proposed by Zhang et al. [28], which consists of the following steps.
• Key Generation and Pre-distribution: Prior to the network deployment, the TA
sets up the system parameters as follows:
– Let G be a cyclic additive group generated by P , GT be a cyclic multiplica-
tive group, and G and GT have the same order q. Let eˆ : G ×G → GT be
a bilinear map.
– The TA first randomly chooses s1, s2 ∈ Z
∗
q as its two master keys, and
computes Ppub1 = s1P, Ppub2 = s2P as its public keys.
– Each pseudo identity ID is composed of two cipher texts, ID1 and ID2. The
private key generation module is responsible for computing a private key
based on ID1 and ID2. Thus, the resultant private key also contains two
parts, denoted as SK1 and SK2.
• Message Signing :
– A vehicle, denoted by Vi, first generates the traffic related message denoted
by Mi.
– Vi picks a pseudo identity ID
i = (IDi1, ID
i
2) and the corresponding private
key SKi = (SKi1, SK
i
2) by way of the tamper-proof device.
– With the private key SKi, Vi can compute the signature σi of the message
Mi, where
σi = SK
i
1 + h(Mi)SK
i
2 .
– Subsequently, Vi sends out the final message 〈ID
i,Mi, σi〉.
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• Signature Verification: Given the system public parameters
{G,GT , q, P, Ppub1, Ppub2} assigned by the TA, and the message 〈ID
i,Mi, σi〉 sent
by Vi, the signature σi is valid if
eˆ(σi, P ) = eˆ(ID
i
1, Ppub1) · eˆ(h(Mi)H(ID
i
1 ‖ ID
i
2), Ppub2) .
A.3 An IBOOS Scheme from Ref. [104]
In this appendix, we provide the detailed description of an IBOOS scheme. This
IBOOS scheme is proposed by Xu et al. [104]. The IBOOS scheme consists of the
following five algorithms, Setup, Extract, OffSign, OnSign and Verify.
• Setup: Given a cyclic additive group G1 and its generator P , pick a random s ∈
Z∗q , and set Ppub = sP . Choose cryptographic hash functions H0 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1
and H1 : {0, 1}
∗ ×G1 → Z
∗
q .
The system parameters are (P, Ppub, H0, H1). The master key is s. H0 and H1
behave as random oracles.
• Extract : Given an identity ID, the algorithm computes DID = sH0(ID) and
output it as the private key related to ID, corresponding to QID = H0(ID).
• OffSign: Given a secret key DID, pick a random number r ∈ Z
∗
q and a
random secret number x ∈ Z∗q , output the oﬄine signature pair (S,R), where
S = 1
r
DID, R = xP .
• OnSign: Given a message m and the oﬄine signature S, compute the online
signature as σ = H1(m,R)x+ r. The resulting signature is a triple (S, σ, R).
• Verify : Given a signature tuple (S, σ, R) of a message m for an identity ID, check
whether (Ppub, σP −H1(m,R)R, S,QID) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.
1
A.4 An IBOOS Scheme from Ref. [59]
In this appendix, we provide the detailed description of an IBOOS scheme. This
IBOOS scheme is proposed by Liu et al. [59]. The IBOOS scheme consists of the
following five steps, setup, extract, oﬄine-sign, online-sign and verify.
1The detailed explanations of “Diffie-Hellman tuples” can be found in [113] and [114].
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• Setup: Let G be a multiplicative group with order q. The PKG selects a random
generator g ∈ G and chooses x ∈ Z∗q . It sets X = g
x, and let H : {0, 1} → Z∗q be a
cryptographic hash function. The master secret key msk and public parameters
param and are given by
msk = x, param = (G, q, g,X,H).
• Extract : To generate a secret key for identity ID, the PKG randomly selects
r ∈ Z∗q , computes
R← gr, s← r +H(R, ID)x modq.
The user secret key is (R, s).
• oﬄine-sign: At the oﬄine stage the signer computes:
Yˆi ← g
−2i, for i = 0, . . . , q−1
• Online-sign: At the online stage, the signer randomly selects y ∈ Z∗q , and let
y[i] be the i-th bit of y. Define γ ⊂ {1, . . . , q} to be the set of indices such that
y[i] = 1. Compute
Y ←
∏
i∈γ
Yˆi−1, h← H(Y,R,m), z ← y + hs modq.
The signature is (Y,R, z).
• Verify : To verify the signature (Y,R, z) for message m and identity ID, the
verifier first computes h← H(Y,R,m) and checks whether
gz
?
= Y RhXhH(R,ID).
For correctness, note that Y = gy.
Accept if it is equal. Otherwise reject.
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Appendix B
Replies to Comments in the
Dissertation Preliminary Review
It is a great honor of me to express gratitudes to the professors of my dissertation
committee members: Prof. Eiji Okamoto, Prof. Kazuhiko Kato, Prof. Kazuki Katag-
ishi, and Prof. Shigetomo Kimura, for their preliminary reviews of the dissertation.
I gratefully appreciate the comments of the professors, and present my replies to the
comments in the dissertation preliminary review, one by one in this chapter.
Reply to Prof. Eiji Okamoto’s Comments
1. Comment:
There is no proof for security in the proposed protocols and frameworks.
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. In this dissertation, we design balanced network
architectures for the desired requirements such as transmission efficiency, network
feasibility and security. We proposed secure communications for Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) and authentication frameworks for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
(VANETs), by utilizing and adapting the identity-based signature (IBS) schemes
and the identity-based online/oﬄine signature (IBOOS) schemes, respectively in
the corresponding communication structures and scenarios.
The proposed ACPN properly functions based on the validity and accuracy
of the adopted encryption/decryption cryptographies, and the public-key cryp-
tography (PKC), IBS and IBOOS schemes used in the proposed protocols are
assumed reliable of their functionalities (i.e., the cryptographic algorithms in
[28, 37, 59, 104, 108]). The cryptographic proofs provided in these adopted
PKC, IBS and IBOOS schemes prove the correctness of security in the proposed
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protocols for the WSN and VANET communications. From the points above,
we consider it important to describe the security characteristics, and analyze
the system availabilities against security attacks. Thus, we mainly focus on
providing the analysis of security requirements of the proposed protocols, and
the solutions and countermeasures to the attackers and adversaries on security
in WSNs and VANETs. For the sake of better evaluating the security in the
proposed protocols, we first add new descriptions of attack models, and group
attack models into categories according to their main attacking purpose and
means (Chapter 4.7.1.1, page 49; and Chapter 7.2.2, page 100). We then analyze
the security requirements and features, detail the solutions and countermeasures
of the proposed protocols against various investigated adversaries and attacks,
respectively for WSNs and VANETs (Chapter 4.7.1.2, page 50; and Chapter 7.5,
page 111).
2. Comment:
How do the parameters of the digital signatures be computed or set in the network
simulation? (For example, the energy consumptions of online and oﬄine signing
in IBOOS.)
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. In this dissertation, we have utilized the existing
IBS schemes [28, 37] and the IBOOS schemes [59, 104] for both WSNs and
VANETs, in order to design balanced architectures of the network for the desired
requirements such as transmission efficiency, network feasibility and security.
For the cryptographic parameters in the system evaluations of the proposed
protocols for WSNs and VANETs, we mainly obtained the evaluation parameters
from the adopted references. For example, Table 7.2 on page 115 lists up the
parameters used for the comparison of signing/verification energy efficiency using
different cryptographies by IBS and IBOOS schemes [28, 37, 59, 104]. Whereas
for the evaluation parameters that are not provided in the original cryptographic
references, we obtained and estimated from the related references on public-key
cryptographies [49, 50, 54, 69]. Meanwhile, For the device power consumption
parameters in the network simulations of the proposed protocols for CWSNs,
we set the simulation parameters based on the parameters used in [16], and the
practical sensor nodes, e.g., MPR2400CB [47].
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Reply to Prof. Kazuhiko Kato’s Comments
1. Comment:
I think the proposed protocols are difficult to be practically implemented. How
do you consider about the implementation?
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. In this dissertation, we investigated the criteria for
protecting the transmitted data in the wireless communication, and designed
balanced architectures of the network for the desired requirements such as
transmission efficiency, network feasibility and security.
In order to carry out the research, we focused on providing security to the data
communication in the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and the Vehicular Ad
hoc Networks (VANETs) based on the authentication service. These researches
provide me a base to carry on the continuous research in the authentication
service realization for security in wireless communications. In this dissertation,
we evaluated the proposed protocols for WSNs and VANETs through the
quantitative calculations and network simulations. However, the results from
calculations and simulations may differ from the real-world results because of
uncertainties in the parameter settlings. Therefore, the implementations of the
research on actual vehicles and sensor nodes are necessary in the performance
evaluations for practical research, even though it may cost a great deal of money
and time. Furthermore, we consider it necessary to execute the practical imple-
mentations in order to do the deep-going and continuous research in this field.
Although we could not achieve the practical implementations of the proposed
protocols for evaluation, we are willing to carry out projects to implement on
actual wireless devices to obtain results in the real-world WSNs and VANETs in
the near future.
2. Comment:
How did you set the parameters in the network simulation for the proposed SET
protocols (Chapter 4.7.3, page 53)?
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. In the proposed protocols, we consider a WSN
consisting of a fixed base station (BS) and a large number of wireless sensor nodes,
which are homogeneous in functionalities and capabilities. A sensor node is any
device that maps a physical quantity from the environment to a quantitative
measurement, which is the main component of a WSN. Advances in sensors
technologies, low-power electronics, and low-power radio frequency design have
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enabled the development of small, relatively inexpensive and low-power sensor,
such as MICA and Telos nodes from Crossbow Technology (MEMSIC) [68, 115].
Therefore, in the network simulations of the proposed protocols for CWSNs, we
set the simulation parameters based on the parameters used in [16, 37, 59], and
the practical sensor nodes, e.g., MPR2400CB [47].
Reply to Prof. Kazuki Katagishi’s Comments
1. Comment:
You should clarify your originalities and contributions of your work.
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. In this dissertation, we focus on the self-organizing
networks in the wireless networks, specifically, the Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) and the Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs).
Cluster-base architecture has been proposed to provide an efficient way to save
energy during communication in WSNs, thus, CWSNs (cluster-based WSNs) has
been being investigated in the last decade [8]. In this dissertation, we investigate
vulnerabilities of security in CWSNs and introduce the drawbacks of the existing
work (e.g., [9, 13, 53]). Because of applied symmetric key management for
security, these protocols suffer from a so-called orphan node problem that has
been introduced in Chapter 4.1.1, page 30. We have addressed the contributions
of the proposed protocols more clearly and more specifically for CWSNs in
Chapter 4.1.2, page 31.
The creation of VANETs is not only significant to traffic management and
roadside safety, but also raises various new research challenges, where privacy
preservation and non-repudiation are two primary concerns. In this disserta-
tion, we utilize the ID-based crypto-system for authentication, the PKC-based
pseudonym for conditional privacy preservation and non-repudiation. To the best
of our knowledge, the proposed CPAN is the first work to apply the ID-based
online/oﬄine signature (IBOOS) scheme into VANETs to solve security issues in
the literature, by which higher efficiency is achieved. Although the conditional
privacy in VANETs has been proposed by researchers, the proposed mechanism
on the pseudonym generation and the pseudonym-based privacy preservation
are unique from the existing work. The main contributions have been addressed
more clearly and more specifically for VANETs in Chapter 7.1.2, page 98.
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Reply to Prof. Shigetomo Kimura’s Comments
1. Comment:
The operation of the proposed protocols is divided in rounds for cluster-based
WSNs (CWSNs), and you consider counting time in rounds. How often do the
cluster-head sensor nodes rotate in CWSNs?
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. According to the operation of the proposed protocol
for CWSNs, there is a cost in terms of time and energy to set up the clusters in
rounds. Therefore in a round, steady-state phase should be long compared with
the setup phase to amortize the overhead of cluster formation. On the other
hand, since the energy at each node is limited, running the steady-state phase
for too long will drain the energy of the cluster-head (CH) nodes. Therefore,
there is a trade-off in how long to make the steady-state phase.
The total energy drained from each node per round depends on the number of
frames per round, Nframes/round. Thus, we can illustrate the energy consumption
per round as follows.
ECH/round = Nframes/round × ECH/frame,
Eleaf/round = Nframes/round × Eleaf/frame.
(1)
Where ECH/frame is the energy consumption for CHs to receive all signals from
leaf nodes (i.e., non-CH nodes), the energy to aggregate the signals, and the
energy to send the fused data to BS, while Eleaf/frame is the energy consumption
for leaf nodes to send data to its CH, respectively.
The method of determining how often to rotate the clusters is to ensure that
each node’s energy lasts long enough to allow the node to be a CH once during
its lifetime, and leaf nodes during the other rounds of the network operation.
Assume that there are N
k
rounds before each node has been a CH, where N
is the number of nodes in a WSN, and k is the number of clusters in a round.
Thus, each node should have enough energy to be a CH once and leaf nodes
( N
k
− 1) times. Denoting the initial energy of each sensor node as Einit, it can
be calculated as the following.
Einit = ECH/round + (
N
k
− 1)Eleaf/round,
= Nframes/round × Eelec:CH + (
N
k
− 1)Nframes/round × Eelec:leaf .
(2)
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Where Eelec:CH is the energy consumption of a CH communication, and Eelec:leaf
is the energy consumption of a leaf node’s communication, respectively in one
frame. Then by plugging in the values of Eelec:CH and Eelec:leaf (referred to
the references in Chapter 4.7.3 in page 53 and the parameters in LEACH
protocol simulation [116]), then we can have the number of frames per round:
Nframes/round = 167 frames.
2. Comment:
How did you choose the parameters and metrics of evaluations, and for what
scenario of WSNs do you consider? For example, the bit rate of a sensor node
has been set to 100 kbps in the network simulation, and you used the metric of
FND (the time when first node dies) for the evaluation of the proposed protocols
for WSNs.
Reply:
Thank you for the comments. In WSNs, we consider that a sensor is any
device that maps a physical quantity from the environment to a quantitative
measurement. Advances in sensors technologies, low-power electronics, and low-
power radio frequency design have enabled the development of small, relatively
inexpensive and low-power sensor, such as MICA and Telos nodes from Crossbow
Technology (MEMSIC) [68, 115]. Therefore, in the network simulations of the
proposed protocols for CWSNs, we set the simulation parameters based on the
parameters used in [16, 37, 59], and the practical sensor nodes, e.g., MPR2400CB
[47] which has a transmission data rate of 38.4 ∼ 250 kbps.
In the evaluation of the proposed protocols for CWSNs, we used the metric of
the time of FND (first node dies) to evaluate the system lifetime. The definition
of system lifetime can be used to determine how alive a system is. It is difficult
to have a precise criterion to define the WSN lifetime, because users can define
system lifetime differently based on different applications. There exist some
lifetime definitions of WSNs, such as the time when the first node dies (FND),
the time when half of the nodes alive (HNA), or the time that the network breaks
in two or more segments [5, 117].
In some cases of WSNs, it is necessary that all nodes stay alive as long as
possible, since network quality decreases considerably as soon as one node dies.
The WSN scenarios for this case include emergency surveillance, intrusion and
fire detections. In these scenarios it is important to know when the first node
dies, and FND denotes an estimated time for the event of a specific network
configuration. Furthermore, sensors can be placed in proximity to each other.
Thus, adjacent sensors could record related or identical data. Hence, the loss of a
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single or few nodes does not automatically diminish the quality of service of the
network. Therefore, we use the general definition of lifetime in this dissertation,
in which maximizing the time of FND leads to the maximization of the WSN
lifetime.
3. Comment:
Have you considered the multi-hop communication WSNs in your work?
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. In large scale WSNs, multi-hop data transmission
can be used for data transmission between the sensor nodes to the BS, where the
direct communication is not possible due to the distance or obstacles between
them. The version of the proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS protocols for
CWSNs can be extended using multi-hop routing algorithms, in order to form
secure data transmission protocols with hierarchical clusters for large scale
WSNs. The solutions to this extension could be achieved by applying either
of the following two routing models.
• The multi-hop planar model: A CH node transmits data to the BS by
forwarding its data to its neighbor nodes, in turn the data is sent to the BS.
We have proposed an energy efficient routing algorithm for hierarchically
clustered WSNs in [64], and it is suitable for the proposed secure data
transmission protocols.
• The cluster-based hierarchical method: The network is broken into clustered
layers, and the data packages travel from a lower cluster head to a higher
one, in turn to the BS, e.g., [65].
The explanations of the multi-hop communication in the proposed protocols with
hierarchical clustering have been added to Chapter 4.6.2 in page 48.
4. Comment:
There is no network simulation for the evaluation of VANETs in your work.
Reply:
Thank you for the comment. For the performance evaluation of vehicular
authentication for VANETs in the existing work, some only use the time cost on
authentication (e.g., ref [22, 78]), some only use the transmission overhead size for
security (e.g., ref [11]), some only use the system analysis (e.g., ref [18, 24, 118]),
and some use several of the above metrics (e.g., ref [21, 23, 28]). Meanwhile,
we did not evaluate the proposed authentication frameworks for VANETs in
network simulations for the reason that, we could not find a network simulator,
142 Replies to Comments
which provides an efficient platform for the performance evaluation of vehicular
authentication in VANETs. Therefore, in the performance evaluation of the
proposed authentication frameworks, we performed the analysis of the desired
security requirements in VANETs, and the quantitative calculations of the
communication and computational overheads for the vehicular authentication.
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